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ABSTRACT
As society begins to recognize its impact on ecological systems, the belief that modern
political institutions can offer a sense of control and certainty, as well as protect the health of its
citizens, is increasingly questioned. In an era of uncertainty, faith in science and technology to
alleviate industrial impacts on the environment is often embraced by policymakers yet
questioned by the public who see the authoritative role of the sciences in the political sphere as
contributing to global risk. The development of biotechnology, specifically genetically modified
food, places an anthropocentric focus on resolving and/or adapting to environmental degradation,
further reflecting an adherence to the dominant social paradigm to address the consequences of
modernization. In order to explicate the dualism of human/nature relations inherent in
biotechnology, the focus of this research provides an exploration into two competing paradigms
of genetically modified organism (GMO) regulatory policy: scientific rationality and social
rationality. Through a careful examination of the evolution of GMO regulation in the United
States and the European Union, the precarious relationships between science and politics and
progress and precaution reveal an actual convergence instead of divergence between these two
actors in the international system. Although existing literature proclaims a division between the
values and ethics of U.S. and EU environmental policy, the end result of this comparison in
GMO regulation illustrates that in both the risk assessment and precautionary approaches, nature
is still viewed as an instrument for advancing enclosure of the commons.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
As an increasingly global, interconnected society begins to recognize its impact on
ecological systems, the belief that modern political institutions can continue to offer a sense of
control and certainty to counteract these impacts on the environment slowly diminishes in
strength. Ulrich Beck (1999) introduces the concept of world risk society to draw attention to
the limited controllability of the dangers that we have created for ourselves through the
industrialization process. He states that in a world risk society, “non-Western societies share
with the West not only the same space and time but…the same basic challenges” (Beck 1999, p.
2). It is this idea that begins to alter what Beck sees as a bias affecting Western social science,
one that places non-Western societies into the category of “traditional” or the opposite of
modernity. Modern challenges for society are widespread and collective in nature. In this
modern world, all are affected by new environmental hazards, both Western and non-Western
nations. Global environmental issues like climate change and biodiversity loss illustrate the
challenges of the risk society in that they are dangers produced by civilization and not by one
specific country or group. In order to properly address these global consequences of the first
modernity, Beck states that risk society demands an “opening up of the decision-making process,
not only of the state but of private corporations and the sciences as well” (p. 5). A new,
interdisciplinary approach that does not grant privilege to any specific form of knowledge and
forces people to combine different rationality claims could help to construct an effective public
sphere in which questions of value can be properly debated.
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It is interesting to note that in this era of increasing uncertainty, the role of science and
technology in society has either been further embraced in an attempt to adapt to global risks or
has come under serious question by the public who see the authoritative role of the sciences in
policy as contributing to global risk. Anthony Giddens (1990) describes industry as an entity
that transforms nature and modern industry as one that is shaped by an alliance of science and
technology where industrialism “becomes the main axis of the interaction of human beings with
nature in the conditions of modernity” (p. 60). The development of biotechnology and genetic
engineering places an anthropocentric focus on resolving environmental problems, further
reflecting a faith in industrial science and technology to solve the consequences of
modernization. The placement of these values on scientific discovery, reinforcing a separation
between human and non-human nature, promotes a utilitarian, or purely instrumental approach to
nature. This approach then accentuates the domination of humans over nature in contrast to a
more integrative approach which would promote an equal standing for human and non-human
actors (Latour 1999). In the realm of biotechnology and genetically modified food products, we
see the implementation of this utilitarian calculus as nature is manipulated to promote human
progress.
For the politics of biotechnology and genetic modification of food and plants, the
separation of the individual‟s identity from the community in modern liberalism echoes the
severance of the link between man and nature in the industrial agricultural model. Self-interest is
no longer aligned with a sense of responsibility for nature. The farmer who rearranges the land
for human consumption is replaced by the industrial factory model, reinforcing a dualism
between humans and nature, subjects and objects (Plumwood 1993; Latour 1999). The farmer‟s

2

identity is thereby separated from the natural community through the introduction of the
industrial process where nature is redefined as an „invisible background…against which the
„foreground‟ achievements of reason or culture take place” (Plumwood 1993, p. 4). This
division holds implications for the developing world, where private ownership of land and seed
lies in direct contrast to the set of beliefs inherent in the community, in which the seed is
considered part of the commons.

This also bears relevance for industrialized countries as the

policy challenges of the twenty-first century demand a more participatory structure for
adequately assessing and resolving the risk inherent with human manipulation of the natural
world, a structure based on discussion and accountability.
Ulrich Beck (1992) argues that the industrialization of agriculture represents the end of
the “antithesis between nature and society” (80). Nature is no longer understood as existing
“outside” of society nor society understood as existing “outside” of nature. Where 19th century
ways of thinking placed nature as an object in opposition to society, Beck argues that this way of
thinking has now essentially been nullified by the industrialization process itself. Bruno Latour
(1999) further asserts that we need to abandon the existing social construction of “nature” and
break down the barrier between subjects and objects in order to reconstruct a true public
discourse to address environmental problems. The very use of the term, “nature,” indicates a
separation between nature and society, human and non-human, subject and object. Therefore,
for Latour the solution to bringing science and democracy together lies in the deconstruction of
these divisions in society and a redistribution of powers in which the social collective is extended
to include non-human actors. Plumwood (1993) also discusses the problems inherent in the
human/nature construction and argues that the current dualism of the human/nature relation can
3

explain many of the “problematic features of the West‟s treatment of nature which underlie the
environmental crisis” (2). She emphasizes, however, that dualisms in general are a Western
construction, a feature of Western thought, and not a universal concept. For Plumwood, the
dualism concept is closely associated with domination and accumulation and a “modern, postEnlightenment consciousness” (43). This Enlightenment perspective introduces a mechanistic
view of the world in which nature is divided into parts to be tinkered with, infusing an
instrumental value to nature instead of an intrinsic value (Merchant 1980).
Proponents of biotechnology embrace the process of “tinkering” with nature, seeing this
as beneficial to the global population. These supporters of genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) do not view the erosion of biodiversity as a great concern; rather, they view this as a
type of collateral damage in the fight against starvation in the developing world. Thomas
DeGregori, for example, states that disease-resistant varieties of crops are “essential for
developing countries [and] have an untapped potential for producing food, fiber, fuel and
medicine” (DeGregori 2001: p. 97). He goes on to argue that with or without the introduction of
genetically modified crops, farmers around the globe will continue to embrace higher yielding or
disease-resistant crop varieties, meaning that “through time, antique or traditional varieties will
no longer be cultivated and in that sense, biodiversity will be further „eroded‟” (DeGregori 2001,
p. 97). Indeed, DeGregori sees the main victims of a moratorium on GM crops as the poor and
vulnerable population in the developing world. Dennis Avery (1995) of the Hudson Institute
echoes these same sentiments in his praise for the Green Revolution and the ability of genetics to
increase the potential of food production. Never once does he mention, however, the
environmental impacts of genetic manipulation; Avery instead embraces a view of nature and
4

biotechnology more in line with the dominant social paradigm (Dunlap and Van Liere 1984) and
a mechanistic perspective that Merchant (1980) associates with Enlightenment values. He states
that “biotechnology can be misused – as airplanes and wheels and dynamite can be misused,”
going on to put forth the belief that humanity and the environment however would be much
worse off without the advances of biotechnology (Avery 1995: p. 224).
By only viewing the products of biotechnology as beneficial to man and the environment
(although only in an instrumental capacity), certain problems arise with the risk of ecological
destruction. This type of destruction is one that can occur with the process of turning nature into
a commodity for consumption. One of the largest risks in manipulating the DNA structure of
plants and crops is the risk of invasiveness (Wolfenbarger and Phifer 2000). Genetic
modifications can potentially “create changes that enhance an organism‟s ability to become an
invasive species,” causing unintended degradation of ecosystem functions (Wolfenbarger and
Phifer 2000: p. 2088). Other risks involved in the genetic manipulation of plant DNA include
non-target effects on beneficial or native organisms as well as the introduction of new viruses.
An example of non-target effects of genetically modified plants is seen in the effects of Bt corn
on the monarch butterfly. This version of corn produces a toxin that is not only deadly to the
European corn borer but also to monarch caterpillars, an unintended consequence of genetic
manipulation (Losey, Rayor and Carter 1999).
The topic of GMOs and GM food in particular represents “one of the most high profile
disputes affecting environmental politics in the current era” (Toke 2007: 407). The controversy
over GM products is illustrative of the previously discussed mechanistic view of the world as
well as Beck‟s risk society theory which links the “rise of environmental concern to the
5

emergence of new technologies…with great potential for environmental impact” (407). The
conflicts inherent in the production and distribution of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
reflect a mechanistic view of the world through the commodification of life forms and the use
and manipulation of the gene pool for advancing the industrial process and favoring
anthropocentric interests at the expense of the natural world. For the biotechnology industry,
there is “no difference between patenting a life form and patenting an industrial product” (Coban
2004: 738). The objectification of life forms is extended through the logic of patents in which
“nature” is separated from humans and made into an object to be exploited, reinforcing a dualist
understanding of nature/human relations (Coban 2004; Meyer 2000). GM crops also represent a
case of political power imposing specific market pressures onto farmers and consumers as the
state seeks to separate “risk” from “ethics” while “reducing both realms to specialist tasks”
(Levidow 2001). Contentious issues over controlling nature and society are reduced to
fragments of administrative control. Technological innovation and the central role of the market
are promoted as solutions to the problems of inefficiency, yet as Levidow (2001) argues, these
solutions often aggravate existing insecurities.
The focus of my research in this thesis will center on explicating this dualist
understanding of human/nature relations in biotechnology and examining two competing
paradigms of GMO regulation: scientific rationality, embedded in a laissez-faire, market-driven
atmosphere and social rationality, embedded in a social democratic emphasis on the public
interest over industrial progress. In order to properly illustrate the effects of these two regulatory
paradigms, this analysis will carefully examine the regulatory policies of the United States and
the European Union concerning GMOs and address the possible conflicts between progress and
6

precautionary restraint. This research will, in turn, also highlight the precarious relationship that
exists between science and politics via the regulatory process and attempt to illustrate that while
these two cases are often framed as divergent in their approach to environmental issues
(Eckersley 2007; Elliott 1998; Faure & Vig 2004; Isaac 2002; Lynch and Vogel 2001), both the
United States and the European Union actually treat the gene pool, and by extension the natural
non-human world, as an instrumental tool for advancing an enclosure of the commons. While
the EU is more restrained in its approach to the genetic manipulation of nature, a capitalist
structure is still embedded in this regulatory process. The conflict between the risk assessmentbased approach of the United States toward biotechnology and the precautionary-based approach
of the European Union presents an interesting puzzle when considered in light of the perceived
universal nature of scientific discovery and progress.

If the concept of progress in the sciences is illustrated by advances in biotechnology and
genetic engineering, why do we see two separate approaches to the application of this
knowledge from two equally influential actors in the international system?


Does a true divergence in GMO policy between these two actors exist or is their a
growing trend toward convergence on genetic engineering policies?



Do the U.S. and EU regulatory regimes reflect a fundamental difference in values
and moral acceptability of the fundamental alteration of nature or do these
regulatory regimes merely reflect a difference in the political structure and
hierarchy of the decision-making process?
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The enclosure of the genetic commons not only has an impact on Western society but
also greatly influences the trajectory of development in the Global South. The privatization of
knowledge through the extension of intellectual property rights to seeds and plants challenges
sovereignty of the state in the biodiversity-rich Global South and also challenges the very logic
behind the progress of science itself. If knowledge in science is a common resource to be
improved upon and expanded (Kuhn 1996; Lakatos 1968; Popper 1959), then the
commodification of these biological resources also creates a commodification of intellectual
labor and knowledge, initiating a sense of enclosure to the commons. I believe that the research
undertaken in this thesis is important because it departs from the previous literature on this
regulatory conflict on GMOs in the U.S. and EU by implementing an analysis of the regulatory
language in both cases to illustrate an overall similarity in the end goal for both the United States
and the European Union, while highlighting the subtle differences in regulatory policy that often
get emphasized by those who see an impermeable divide between these two cases. Prior
literature on the topic has tended to focus mainly on the intricacies of the regulatory process and
the conflicts that exist between trade and biodiversity conservation, or on a larger level between
the economy and the environment. My research will branch out from this existing literature by
incorporating a study of the vacillating role of the knowledge creation process in environmental
politics, specifically the politics of GMO regulation. In addition, part of the biotechnology
literature addresses the impact of media representations of GMOs on the public sphere (Bauer
2001; Cook 2004; Ramjoue 2007), correlating the level of negative media coverage on GMOs to
negative public perception of these products. My research will add to this debate on competing
notions of scientific progress, the construction of knowledge and the politicization of the
8

sciences as a potential means to advance political and economic ends and illustrate that specific
differences in regulatory language reflect more on the differences between economic and social
responsibility than they do on the public‟s sensitivity to negative media coverage on these issues.
The framework of this comparative study of U.S. and EU regulatory processes consists of
a thorough review of the literature concerning science and the knowledge creation process as
well as the ever-changing role for science in policymaking. By exploring the very basics of the
demarcation between science and politics, one can better understand the role of uncertainty in the
knowledge creation process and the way in which scientists understand uncertainty and anomaly
as part of a larger, systematic epistemology. The incorporation of the scientific process into the
political arena is illustrated by a discussion of the role of science advisors in regulatory
policymaking and the growing displacement of trust in scientific authority for environmental
politics. A brief discussion of existing paradigmatic structures for regulatory policymaking and
their emphases on economic versus social responsiveness (Isaac 2002) will follow to serve as an
illustrative lens for viewing the potential divergence of GMO policies in the U.S. and EU. The
third chapter explores the regulatory policies of the European Union and its adoption of a
precautionary approach under the paradigm of social rationality. The language of the EU
regulatory regime is examined in order to build upon a social rationality model of GMO
regulation and to illustrate the emphasis human health safety and not necessarily a concern for
the alteration of the ecological system. This is supplemented by an examination of public
sentiment toward biotechnology and genetic engineering processes, focusing on the public‟s
knowledge of biotechnology as well as its conceptualization of risk and moral acceptability of
genetic modification in plant and food production. Chapter 4 explores the different approach to
9

regulating GMOs undertaken by the United States and the economic focus of its risk
management framework, embedded in scientific authority and the support of industrial interests.
This chapter also provides a glimpse into the public comment process as a method of fostering a
greater range of public participation in the regulatory decision-making process. A comparison of
the two regulatory regimes, highlighting a lack of concern with the possibility of ecological
destruction at the hands of technological progress follows in order to properly show a trend
toward convergence of regulatory policies, dependent upon the type of risk involved. Chapter 5
will then offer a conclusion and discussion of these two approaches to GMO regulation and the
consequences of genetic engineering for global ecological concerns, a reflection on how nature is
viewed in the political process.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
As contemporary society realizes its impact on ecological systems, the separation
between nature and civilization, fact and value, begins to subside. The previous models of
control, security and certainty, “so fundamental in the first modernity,” slowly dissolve along
with the modern conception of science (Beck, 1999, p. 2). Whether devising guidelines to
differentiate between science and non-scientific practices or following Latour‟s (2004)
abandonment of the dichotomy between nature and civilization in order to extract the core of
modern science from its political shell, it is clear that the roles of science and technology have
changed over time to reflect the new challenges that “industrial science” has created. Before we
can address the current relationship between science, politics, and society, however, it is
important to first examine the sources and limits of knowledge. The blurring of the demarcation
line between science and politics has opened the door for questioning the legitimacy of scientific
practice as it is used in the political arena and debating whether or not “modern science” is the
only successful method for addressing new environmental challenges (Feyerabend, 1978).
For centuries, the sciences have operated in a world of subjects and objects which Latour
argues are “names given to forms of representative assemblies, so that they can never bring
themselves together in the same space…” (Latour, 2004, p. 72). This constant division between
actors has enabled science and politics to operate on their own terms, never mixing, to address
the policies and results that are infused into society. Nevertheless, the policy challenges of the
twenty-first century permeate this border as “nature” has now re-entered the social world,
affecting humans and society through the consequences of industrial modernization.
11

The realm of biotechnology illustrates a set of values and beliefs that place humanity at
the center of concern and renders those considerations that do not involve the welfare of
humanity as irrelevant. A clear example of these values is shown in the controversy over the
effects of a transgenic corn species on the monarch butterfly. A study in May 1999 by John
Losey and his colleagues (Losey, Rayor and Carter 1999) showed that a GM corn variety, called
Bt corn because it contains genes from the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis, produces a toxin
that is not only deadly to a common pest (the European corn borer) but also to monarch
caterpillars. These experiments seemed to show that Bt-corn was dangerous not only to a
common pest, “but also to a species that no one had any intention of harming” (Jasanoff 2005:
108). Although the biotechnology industry succeeded in framing the scientific debate to refute
any logical connection between the monarch study and commercial uses of this type of corn,
many environmental NGOs and activist groups challenged the point that “science” had
adequately established the safety of these products or mitigated the risks of these products to
non-target species.
This manipulation of nature for the perceived benefits of efficiency and food security
reinforces the dichotomy between nature and civilization and serves to further blur the
demarcation line between science and politics. It has opened the door for questioning the
legitimacy of scientific practice as used in its political shell and debating whether or not the
knowledge produced by “modern science” is the only successful measure for addressing new
environmental challenges (Feyerabend, 1978). As Bruno Latour (2004) argues, the sciences
have always operated in a world of subjects and objects. This constant division between actors
has enabled science and politics to operate on their own terms to address the policies and results
12

that are infused into society. Nevertheless, the policy challenges of the twenty-first century
permeate this border as “nature” has now re-entered the social world, affecting humans and
society through the consequences of industrial modernization. It now becomes imperative,
according to Latour, that in order to address conflicts in society and create a true discourse in
society, we must abandon nature as a socially constructed idea and embark on a reconstitution of
the social world in which both humans and non-humans have a voice as actors.
Science in its politicized form is what has fueled the call for a separation of its influence
from society simply for the fact that the public is no longer able to differentiate between “the
sciences” and the politicized “Science.”1 Public discourse is therefore in danger of being
drowned out by a reliance on scientific expert opinion. Along with this re-evaluation of the
relationship between science and the political process, biotechnology and especially the creation
of genetically modified crops and plants has opened the door for applying property rights to
knowledge that is taken from original cultivators and turned into a commodity without paying
tribute to the original growers or community, further adding to the enclosure of the genetic
commons (Mushita and Thompson, 2006) and promoting at the most a modern form of
imperialism (Jasanoff 2006; Newell, 2009) and at the least the growing influence of transnational
corporations over the state. Nevertheless, in order to comprehend the problems inherent in
privatizing knowledge for individual gain, it is important to understand the evolving theoretical
debate over what defines science and how progress is measured in the scientific community.

1

Science here is meant to illustrate the idea of scientism which privileges the use of scientific knowledge over all
other ways of knowing. This type of philosophy places the methods of the natural sciences above all other means of
human inquiry.
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Progress and the Creation of Knowledge through Demarcation

The works of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn present competing arguments to the debate
on epistemology and the measurement of progress in the sciences. In two of these works, The
Logic of Scientific Discovery and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, both ends of the
progress spectrum are presented and both Popper and Kuhn make convincing arguments for their
interpretation of scientific discovery; revolution in the sciences is either a permanent fixture or
an exceptional state. To solve the problem of demarcation between science and that which
constitutes non-science, Karl Popper (1965) puts forth the idea of falsification through crucial
experiments. This cycle of conjecture and refutation enables scientific progress to proceed from
less general theories to more general theories in order to expand the content of knowledge.
Popper‟s method provides a logical way of deductively rooting out “bad” theories and
hypotheses that present anomalies in empirical science. Prior to Popper, inductive methodology
was utilized to draw the line of demarcation between scientific and non-scientific endeavors.
The deductive method of testing that is proposed in his work presents a substitution for the
observation-based inductive methods and the problems that arise in the establishment of
universal statements based on experience. As Popper convincingly argues at the onset of his
work, “many people believe that the truth of these universal statements is „known by
experience‟; yet it is clear that an account of an experience can…be only a singular statement”
(Popper, 1965, p. 28). In other words, there are no pure, theory-free observations. Popper
writes in opposition to the positivists who embrace inductive methods or a bottom-up approach
to science, and maintain that knowledge beyond what can be observed is impossible. One can
always find some evidence in support of virtually any scientific theory; however, all scientific
14

theories prohibit some type of occurrence, leading Popper to suggest that “whenever we try to
propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can to overthrow our solution,
rather than defend it” (p. 16). It is with this initial proposition that Popper begins to construct the
crux of his argument which seeks to classify science as a problem-solving process undertaken
through deductive methods of testing. The process of conceiving a new idea should always be
distinguished from the methods of examining a new idea; scientific discovery should advance
through a pattern of conjecture and refutation.
Methodological rules, according to Popper, are the rules of the game in empirical science
and not the rules of pure logic:

(1) The game of science is, in principle without end. He who decides one day that
scientific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be regarded as
finally verified, retires from the game.
(2) Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its mettle, it may not
be allowed to drop out without „good reason.‟ (pp. 53-54).

These “good reasons” may include the replacement of one hypothesis (H1) by another that is
described as better testable (taking the part of H1 that has not been falsified and building H2
which is able to withstand detailed and severe tests) or the falsification of one of the
consequences of the original (H1) hypothesis. This second “good” reason is one that is later
criticized for its erasure of those anomalies that lead to the breakdown of normal science (Kuhn,
1996; Lakatos, 1968). Anomalies are always present during the course of scientific research and
15

experimentation; indeed Lakatos later argues that with any conjecture that is put forth, it is
known which anomalies are present that the conjecture cannot account for (Lakatos, Feyerabend,
& Motterlini, 1999). While on the one hand, Popper‟s falsification criteria present a keen
foreshadowing of the future debate on certainty and consensus in science for policy, on the other,
his demarcation criterion creates ambiguities in the refutation process, thereby negating his
initial proposition. For example, how do we know which anomalies are serious enough to refute
a theory and which are just by-products of experimental error? One can always find anomalies
in a theory just as one can always find observations that verify a theory. A similar question that
has been stated by critics of falsification (Hacking, 1981; Lakatos, 1970) relates to the
relationship between verification, as Popper elaborates it, and falsification: what differentiates a
crucial falsifying experiment of one theory from a verifying experiment of another? The same
argument that Popper had against an inductive methodology appears to infiltrate his own
falsification criteria in that overthrowing one solution is also a method of defending the other.
Although one can always find evidence to support virtually any scientific theory, there is also a
good chance that one can find anomalies to overthrow any scientific theory; in a demarcation
between good and bad theories, Popper‟s methodology places every theory on the bad side (see
Feyerabend, 1993; Lakatos, Feyerabend, & Motterlini, 1999).
In contrast to the refutation of hypotheses through the expulsion of anomalies, Thomas
Kuhn (1996) diverges from Popper‟s methodology and embraces the fact that anomalies exist in
science; these puzzles are what allow scientists to account for a broader scope of natural
phenomena. These discoveries can eventually build, over a certain amount of time, into a
deconstruction of the existing paradigm and the emergence of new theories. Kuhn differentiates
16

between the emergence of discovery and the emergence of theory which enables him to make the
case that revolution in science only occurs in exceptional times. Kuhn advocates the exploration
of anomalies in research, stating that “discovery commences with the awareness of
anomaly…with the recognition that nature has somehow violated…expectations” (Kuhn, 1996,
pp. 52-53). However, it is only when an anomaly becomes more than just a puzzle that the
transition to crisis and the emergence of theories that comprise the new paradigm structure can
begin. It is interesting to point out that while Kuhn embraces the presence of anomalies in the
discovery process, he laments that scientists rarely undertake the invention of alternatives in the
theory-building process. He goes on to argue that science can progress rapidly when it employs
the tools of the paradigm to solve the puzzles of normal-science research, so long as those tools
are capable. Retooling is an “extravagance to be reserved for an occasion that demands it” (p.
76). It appears that while Kuhn emphasizes the role of anomalies in scientific discovery, the
reality shows that alternate theories are not to be considered unless the traditions of normalscience research are incapable of solving the gradual build-up of puzzles during the normalscience period. It is only when the course of scientific study is delayed and the guidelines of the
dominant period begin to falter that the inquiry into alternative theories arises.
The presence of normal science for Kuhn is what characterizes the majority of scientific
research and progress. Normal science is defined as “research firmly based upon one or more
past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community
acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (p. 10). Normal
science is practiced within the dominant paradigm, meaning that whatever puzzles or problems
arise during normal research carry with them the conjectures of the dominant paradigm. When
17

normal, puzzle-solving, science goes astray, investigations then commence that lead the
profession to a new set of commitments. Scientific revolutions, on the other hand, are “traditionshattering complements to the tradition bound activity of normal science” (p. 6). This type of
extraordinary science emerges only on special occasions that are prepared by the advance of
normal science. Kuhn looks to the examples of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier and Einstein to
illustrate major turning points in science and show how these major shifts evolved from normal
science practice. Each one of these turning points required that the scientific community reject
one conventional scientific theory and replace it with an incompatible alternative; in other words,
there was a large enough consensus that the path of research needed to change to incorporate
either new tools for research or a new way of thinking about a research field. Each turning point
also produced a shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny, thus widening the content
of knowledge.
What is important to note in Kuhn‟s work is the role that the scientific community plays
in deciding what advances knowledge and what does not. This type of “elite authoritarianism,”
as argued by Imre Lakatos (Lakatos, Feyerabend, & Motterlini, 1999), claims that the
demarcation criteria in determining the composition of science is “inarticulable” and that
scientific revolutions are always progressive and always lead to an increase in knowledge.
While Kuhn describes the progressive nature of paradigms, it is difficult to see exactly how one
can compare two paradigms in order to determine if a revolution is progressive. Responses to
Kuhn‟s work (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970; Phillips, 1973) have questioned the varying
definitions of the term “paradigm” along with Kuhn‟s explanation, or lack thereof, as to how the
scientific community actually measures progress through paradigm shifts. If “the normal18

scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is…incommensurable with that
which has gone before,” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 103), then how does one conceptualize progress in this
manner? The traditional cumulative nature of science that Popper does actually acknowledge in
his cycle of conjecture and refutation lies in direct contrast to Kuhn‟s concept of scientific
progress. The objectivity that scientists had embraced in the past is now subjugated to the beliefs
of a particular community of participants, solidified by the dominant paradigm, which are then
translated into fact and knowledge. Instead of a dividing line between fact and interpretation,
these two concepts congeal under the dominant paradigm; using Kuhn‟s most elementary
definitions of “normal-science” and “paradigm,” including the role that paradigms play in the
education of scientists, the argument that a scientific community determines what is progress and
what is not does receive valid support. It is the study of paradigms that, according to Kuhn,
“mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientific community with which
he will later practice” (p. 11). This commitment and the consensus that is produced by the study
of paradigms is what permit the continuation of the research tradition. Nevertheless, the social
construction of beliefs inherent in the structure of paradigms presents a problem for retaining any
type of core scientific knowledge.

Paradigms or Research Programmes? Arguments against a Constrictive Methodology

As previously discussed, Kuhn emphasizes the importance of anomalies in the discovery
process; however, his arguments on the constitution of scientific progress lack the firm
foundation that is found in Popper‟s notion of a cumulative science based on a gradual
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progression of “more fit” theories. With Kuhn, the incommensurability of paradigms acts as a
barrier to the normal Popperian concept of progress exemplified through a sophisticated brand of
falsification. To address and build upon this division, Imre Lakatos (1968, 1970) proposes a
methodology of scientific research programmes in which he borrows from Popper‟s falsification
criteria and Kuhn‟s theory of scientific revolution in an attempt to provide a comprehensive
demarcation between what is science and what is not, that which has more truth content and that
which has less. While Lakatos agrees with Popper on the problems of induction, he is largely
critical of the conjecture-refutation cycle that comprises the falsification method. Instead of
focusing on isolated theories in which one proceeds by conjecture and refutation from less
general theories to more general theories in order to expand the content of knowledge, Lakatos
argues that one should focus on a series of theories, or research programme. He rejects Popper‟s
view of the history of science and questions Popper‟s use of anomalies in the refutation process,
specifically asking how one differentiates from a serious anomaly that leads to refutation and a
minor anomaly that does not. Lakatos provides the example of Bohr‟s theory in his criticism of
Popper‟s naïve falsification, arguing that even though Bohr had inconsistencies in the first form
of his theory, he did not drop it altogether. For Lakatos, true scientific revolutions “consist of
one research programme superseding…another” (Lakatos, 1970, p. 115). A research programme
is successful if it leads to a progressive problem-shift; a programme is unsuccessful if it leads to
a degenerating problem-shift.
An important contribution that Lakatos lends to the ongoing epistemological debate is in
his statement that research programmes can be progressive or degenerating; that is to say, might
is not necessarily right. In this proposition, he attempts to use Popperian methodology to show
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that there is “good, progressive normal science and that there is bad, degenerating normal
science” (Lakatos, 1968, p. 167). Kuhn only sees the progressive nature of science; Lakatos
adds the degenerating aspect. In between the “revolution in permanence” and the belief that
“revolution is exceptional,” Lakatos provides a type of middle ground that incorporates aspects
of both Popper and Kuhn. His programme is one in which falsifications are recorded but not
necessarily acted upon and the conventionally accepted “hard core” of science is protected by a
belt of auxiliary hypotheses (1968, p. 150). It is only when the driving forces of the positive
heuristic, which defines problems and constructs the belt of auxiliary hypotheses, weaken that
anomalies are examined more closely. One important difference between Lakatos‟s
methodology and previous arguments rests with the timing of revolution in science. Lakatos
argues throughout his writings that no experiment is crucial at the time it is performed; an
experiment can only be seen as crucial once one research programme has overtaken another.
The use of Newton‟s gravitational theory provides a reinforcement of this proposition as well as
an example of Lakatos‟ criticism of Popper‟s “naïve falsificationism.” When the theory of
gravity was first produced, it was “submerged in an ocean of anomalies” (1968, p. 169).
Nevertheless, Newton was able to turn these anomalies into corroborating instances, representing
a progressive theoretical shift that increased empirical content. Popper‟s falsification criteria
would have discarded this theory at the sight of the first anomaly.
Lakatos borrows from Popper‟s more “sophisticated” falsification in order to construct
his methodology of research programmes. This revised method of falsification takes the scientist
away from making decisions based on isolated theories and advocates for a consideration of one
theory in the company of others. With his integrated methodology, Lakatos also solves Kuhn‟s
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problem of paradigm incommensurability by altering the structure of research to incorporate a
hard core of scientific research which maintains its integrity and an auxiliary hypothesis belt
which can slowly change to accommodate the growing presence of anomalies. In addition,
Lakatos provides criteria for progress and stagnation in scientific research through his
development of problem-shifts and an alteration of Popper‟s “sophisticated” falsification criteria.
A series of theories is considered progressive if each new theory “has some excess empirical
content over its predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact” (Phillips,
1973, p. 20). Lakatos very carefully attempts improve upon Popper‟s falsification criteria, which
he argues is capable of defining the progressive or degenerating nature of scientific research
programmes, and Kuhn‟s theory of paradigms.
The weakness of Lakatos‟s methodology, however, presents itself in almost the same
manner exhibited by Popper‟s original falsification criteria. With Lakatos‟ progressive and
degenerating programmes, how do we know how much time to give a programme that is
degenerating before eliminating it? What if the programme looks like it is degenerating but then
turns out to be progressive? Feyerabend (1993) and Kuhn both focus on this aspect of Lakatos‟s
proposed methodology in their criticisms, offering valid points against certain propositions that
Lakatos presents. Throughout his description of research programmes, Lakatos completely
ignores the decisions that influence what is termed “corroborative” or “progressive,” all of which
are influenced by commitments shared by the community, the paradigm structure that Kuhn
presents and that which is seen as “ideological commitments” by Feyerabend (1978) in his
essays on science and society. Both Kuhn and Feyerabend tend to question the “rational aspect”
of science whereas Popper and Lakatos both see the growth of knowledge as taking place in what
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Popper describes as the “third world…the world of articulated knowledge which is independent
of knowing subjects” (Phillips, 1973, p. 21). Unfortunately, this belief of a rational division of
worlds does not aid the scientists who work in the first two worlds and fails to incorporate a
more democratic process into decision-making. This failure becomes increasingly important as
political scientists, sociologists and historians of science begin to examine the relationship
between science and politics and the fluctuating levels of influence that science has on society.
The view of science as a progressive process that builds upon previous theories is an idea
that permeates throughout much of the history and philosophy of science. While Lakatos
contributes to this literature by adding a degenerating aspect to scientific research, Paul
Feyerabend departs even further from these previous efforts and states that progress has to be
measured by the growth of knowledge that includes an examination of many alternatives;
Western science alone cannot, and should not, account for all scientific progress. Feyerabend
argues that there are no set of methodological rules that all scientists use; elements that constitute
the sciences “have no common structure…procedures that paid off in the past may create havoc
when imposed on the future” (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 1). He is not arguing against the use of any
methodology in science; instead, Feyerabend attempts to show that there is not a standard
methodology to science. Progress occurs through the adoption of a pluralistic methodology that
allows for the creativity of scientists, a type of epistemological anarchism. Science is “our
creation, not our sovereign; it should be the slave of our whims and not the tyrant of our wishes”
(Lakatos, Feyerabend, & Motterlini, 1999, p. 118). According to Feyerabend‟s (1993) thesis, the
problem with Popper‟s falsification criteria, Kuhn‟s paradigms and Lakatos‟s research
programmes is that they all try to simplify scientific achievements and success. Knowledge
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creation is a disorderly process that illustrates the unevenness of scientific development. There
is never a solid line of demarcation that is drawn between scientific and non-scientific pursuits.
In order to support his thesis, Feyerabend uses historical examples to show that the
success of science should not be used to usher in a standardization of methodology to treat
unsolved problems. The central example used here is Galileo‟s defense of the Copernican theory
against the tower argument, a method used by followers of Aristotelian logic to challenge the
theory of the earth‟s rotation. Feyerabend is able to show the benefit of counter-inductive
methods and ad hoc adjustments to protect a new theory from a potential falsifying instance.
This example also aids his criticism of Popper by showing that ad hoc adjustments can actually
have a positive effect on science. Facts, according to Feyerabend (1993), contain ideological
components that are “highly suspicious…first, because of their age and obscure
origin…secondly, because their very nature protects them…from critical examination” (p. 62).
Along the same line of argument that Kuhn (1996) offers in his section on the importance of
anomalies in science, Feyerabend‟s criticism of Popperian methodology states that when a
contradiction arises between a new theory and a collection of established facts, the best
procedure is to discover the reason for the contradiction, not simply abandon the theory. The
quality of new theories should not be judged by a comparison to previously known facts,
something which is referred to as the consistency condition. This type of comparison is
unreasonable because it “preserves the older theory, and not the better theory” (Feyerabend,
1993, p. 24). This condition eliminates alternatives and, therefore, does not increase the content
of knowledge. Through these historical examples, Feyerabend is also able to suggest that
progress occurs in the sciences most often through the violation of existing rules.
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While Feyerabend‟s advocacy for a pluralistic methodology represents a radical departure
from the philosophy of science, his criticisms of “normal-science” and falsification are well
argued and his brand of epistemological anarchism is presented in a clear and concise manner
which makes his argument easier to follow when compared with the ambiguous statements found
in the research programme methodology of Imre Lakatos (1968; , 1970). The methodology of
scientific research programmes attempts to open up the rationalist restrictions of normal science
while simultaneously holding on to a rationalist framework for progress in the sciences. While
the concept of a research programme attempts to bridge the divide between a coherent, standard
methodology and a more pluralistic methodology, Feyerabend‟s theses on epistemological
anarchism provide a way out of the restrictive mold of modern scientific research that previous
historians and philosophers of science have tried to overcome (Feyerabend, 1993; Lakatos,
Feyerabend, & Motterlini, 1999). Nevertheless, Feyerabend never provides a way to eliminate
those theories that simply do not qualify as “good science.” Since there are no mechanisms for
deciding what is to be selected and what is to be rejected in science, every alternative must be
addressed at all times. This would seem to inhibit the progress of science, leading to a reduction
of knowledge instead of an expansion. Although it seems the intention of Feyerabend to reject
the banality of normal scientific procedure, it is precisely within Kuhn‟s period of normal
science research that a series of alternatives can be discussed and either conceptually assimilated
or used to spark an eventual paradigm shift. This restrictive practice is what enables change to
occur, ensuring that a consensus is established before progressing along a new path. Nowhere in
Feyerabend‟s “method” is consensus addressed. Perhaps it is because of this type of consensus,
forged by a series of ideological commitments existent within the dominant paradigm, that
25

modern science has retained an elevated position in political decision-making, a development
that Feyerabend fears will have a negative effect on democratic practice. With the uncertainty
and anomalies inherent in scientific discovery, the question of where to place science in the
policymaking process gains greater importance. Should science be separate from society or is
there a way for scientific expertise to play a role in democracy without sacrificing both sound
methodological practice and democratic values?
Science in its politicized form is what Feyerabend attacks when he argues for a
separation of the influence of “science” from society. He views expert scientific opinion as
exemplary of the perversion of unanimity in the scientific community where “dissenters are
suppressed or remain silent to preserve the reputation of science as a source of trustworthy and
almost infallible knowledge” (Feyerabend, 1978: 88). Bruno Latour‟s solution to this problem, of
course, is a redefinition of political ecology, one in which the sciences are one of several skills
that inform the collective of human and non-human actors. Science is divided here between the
politicized forms lamented by Feyerabend that encapsulates the “ideal of the transportation of
information without discussion or deformation” and the second meaning of science that refers to
the ability to gain access to non-human entities through experiments and calculations (Latour,
1999: 258). The role of scientists is not to make or manage these entitites but to use this access to
enrich their ontology. Latour does not see a division where one side dominates the other; for
modern society to appropriately address ecological conflicts, a wider participatory base is needed
that includes a plurality of alternative ways of knowing in order to advance the best solution.
Stemming from Feyerabend‟s advancement of a more pluralistic methodology, Vandana
Shiva (1997) sees science as a pluralistic enterprise that refers to different ways of knowing.
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Scientific claims arising from the commitment of a specialized community of scientists as
described by Kuhn fail to leave any criteria “to distinguish the theoretical claims of indigenous
non-Western sciences from those of modern Western science” (8). Science is supposed to be an
expression of human creativity, both individual and collective and not an expression of an elite
community of scientists. Shiva views the advancement of modern Western scientific practice
into non-Western cultures as a result of Western cultural and economic hegemony as opposed to
cultural neutrality. This dominant model of scientific knowledge is rendered inadequate by its
reductionist and fragmented characteristics that “are not equipped to take the complexity of
interrelationships in nature fully into account” (8). Society‟s progression towards a
“monoculture of knowledge” ignores the ecologically-based indigenous knowledge systems and
creativity these systems bring to issues pertaining to the life sciences; intellectual diversity is
slowly eroding which presents a contrasting view to Latour‟s reconstruction of political ecology
as a way to engage public discourse. Shiva‟s unique perspective lends weight to the benefits of a
plurality of methods to advance both biodiversity and the intellectual diversity of the sciences.

Science, Knowledge Creation and Policy

Decision-makers who are charged with protecting the environment and public health rely
on scientific and technical expertise to inform their decisions on policy. The assumption that
science is somehow superior to other methods has allowed this discipline to gain a privileged
seat in the policymaking arena. Maintaining the right balance between scientific discovery and
the public interest, however, is an arduous task when theory has to be translated into policy
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prescription. The theoretical literature focusing on science and democracy tends to emphasize
the social construction of science and how scientific communities, as well as institutions
themselves, can influence knowledge creation and subsequently influence democratic practice.
Part of this literature also examines the changing role for scientists in light of current global
environmental challenges that incorporate a higher level of uncertainty and unpredictability. By
ushering in a new place for science in politics, it is possible that the puzzle-solving activities
involved in addressing these new global challenges will pave the road for a more democratic
structure to the sciences and provide a baseline for a more collective approach to solving
environmental problems.
The area of government where science, technology and society converge is in the
regulatory process, primarily in health and environmental policy. The relationship between the
knowledge created by the scientific community and the political agencies that must transform
that knowledge into policy is often plagued with disagreement. Jasanoff (1990) provides an
excellent window into the politics of scientific advice by advancing a critique of the technocratic
and democratic paradigms for managing the use of science in the regulatory process. She argues
that neither approach “takes adequate account of the nature of science or politics,” (Jasanoff,
1990, p. vii). Jasanoff uses a range of cases from the herbicide 2,4,5-T to emissions standards to
illustrate the drawbacks of the democratic model which relies on judicial review and open
administration. She states that the conceptual model developed to deal with technical disputes,
which she terms the “science policy paradigm,” failed because “it created a politically unstable
mix of too much administrative discretion combined with too little judicial deference” (Jasanoff,
1990, p. 40). The push for greater public debate over the legitimacy of science decisions creates
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too much of an altered structure of scientific authority among actors in the regulatory process to
be effective. The technocratic model of science advice is also rejected due to the disparity
between “regulatory science” and “research science.” As Jasanoff effectively argues, the peer
review process is most successful at forging consensus among scientists of similar training and
outlook, those subscribing to the same Kuhnian paradigm. The belief that this process can
translate to a multidisciplinary environment under pressure of regulatory deadlines is tenuous at
best. These criticisms of the technocratic and democratic models provide much needed insight
into the difficulty of applying the methodology and beliefs of “research science” to the public
policy forum.
To support the case for a more realistic account of the role of scientific expertise in policy
decision, Jasanoff draws empirical data from a close examination of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the science
advisory committees affiliated with these agencies. The evolution of the relationship between
the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) and the EPA is an example of “mutual
accommodation between scientists and policymakers” that provides a model for other Science
Advisory Board committees. To examine standards for air pollution control, “the basic boundary
between science and policy had to be carefully readjusted so that neither EPA nor CASAC could
claim exclusive jurisdiction over key elements of the standards setting process” (Jasanoff, 1990,
p. 101). While the EPA works on readjusting boundary lines in its advisory process, most of the
FDA‟s advisory processes involve the blurring of these lines between science and policy. Expert
advisors are allowed to examine evidence from nonscientists as well as scientists and advisory
proceedings are “structured in ways that leave the line of demarcation between FDA‟s decision-
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making authority and that of its scientific advisors ill-defined” (Jasanoff, 1990, p. 178). As
Jasanoff points out, however, the approach used by the FDA works well at reducing conflict over
the interpretation of regulatory science, lending support to her earlier proposition that in order to
prove genuinely useful, “proposals to improve the use of science in the regulatory process have
to be informed by an accurate knowledge of the internal dynamics of both science and
regulation” (Jasanoff, 1990, p. 17). What Jasanoff is successful at showing is that scientific
advising is not as clear-cut as simply restricting the process to technical issues or, even worse,
denying that “values” are irrelevant to the process; the clear boundary line between facts and
values no longer exists. Negotiation among and between scientists and the public is viewed here
as one of the keys to success of the advisory process and a tactic that promises to remain
important as political agencies tasked with environmental and public health policymaking
continue to seek consultation from the scientific community. In the area of biotechnology,
Jasanoff (2005) rearticulates her idea that contemporary societies are constituted as knowledge
societies and important aspects of political action tend to “cluster around the ways in which
knowledge is generated, disputed, and used to underwrite collective decision” (6). She further
argues that the concepts of risk and safety, ideas of causation and blame and crucially for
biotechnology the boundary between “nature” and “culture” have been shown to reflect deepseated social assumptions that rob them of universal validity. It is clear in her work that while
scientists may claim objectivity, policymakers carry on business through careful boundary
maintenance, “favoring some voices and viewpoints at others‟ expense” (14). It is here that the
ideological components and politicization of science that Feyerabend saw as detrimental for
society may provide a greater force than actual scientific objectivity. The case of GMOs,
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especially in agricultural trade policy between developing and developed states, illustrates the
competing interests that policymakers must take into account when developing a framework for
balancing the relationship between political discussion and participation and scientific progress.
Further blurring the lines of demarcation between a) the science of Kuhn and Popper in
which scientific procedures and discoveries occur in an objective, rule-oriented framework, and
b) the science of environmental policy and risk, Jane Lubchenco (1998) and Funtowicz and
Ravetz (1990; , 1993) both address a type of “post-normal” age in which unprecedented
environmental and social changes reveal an increasing amount of uncertainty and
unpredictability. These new issues of the post-normal age differ from traditional scientific
problems in that they are global in scale, have a long-term impact, and the quantitative data on
their effects is largely inadequate. Funtowicz and Ravetz argue that the skills required for
managing these new challenges have largely been neglected due to the reliance on the
“correctness” of scientific assertions and the belief that the language of science is always precise.
This belief, however, “has become recognized as unrealistic and counterproductive…our culture
invests a quality of real truth in numbers, analogous to the way in which other cultures believe in
the magical powers of names” (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990, pp. 9-10). In other words, society‟s
faith in statistical data opens a trap in which the quantity of data presented is placed above the
quality of data.
Quantitative data is capable of seriously misleading those who consume it; the shroud of
certainty that covers statistical data usually makes it more difficult for scientists to advise
policymakers on issues like climate change which carry with them uncertain predictions based
on computer and mathematical models. A concern with quality control in the sciences leads
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Funtowicz and Ravetz to propose a different approach for assessing uncertainty and quality in a
variety of policy issues. The approach of Numeral, Unit, Spread, Assessment, and Pedigree
(NUSAP) moves from a more quantitative to a more qualitative aspect of the information
examined. This approach incorporates both quantitative and qualitative layers of analysis for
investigating levels of uncertainty and attempts to provide an empirical method for assessing the
correct solution for each issue. While this notational scheme provides a new way to approach
policy issues of uncertainty, especially in the realms of pollution and climate change, it also
seems to oversimplify the complex nature of these issues. The more interesting part of their
argument rests in their proposal for a change “in the symbolic and social roles for science”
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990, p. 2). The authors assert through the example of the “Ch-Ch
Syndrome,” coined from the disasters of Chernobyl and the Challenger space shuttle that quality
assurance can no longer be taken for granted. The NUSAP approach “embodies the principle that
uncertainty cannot be banished from science; but that good quality of information depends on
good management of its uncertainties” (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993, p. 740). A new role for
scientists needs to include the use of a proper methodology to manage uncertainty in order to
provide the best quality of information.
The argument put forth by Funtowicz and Ravetz in Science for the Post-Normal Age
presents a more convincing case as it consolidates their previous work into a clear and concise
proposal for how to alter current scientific methodology in order to better address global
environmental risks. The extension of the peer community to include all stakeholders in an issue
opens up the possibilities for “enriching the processes of scientific investigation” (Funtowicz &
Ravetz, 1993, p. 753). Nevertheless, it is clear that the authors would not advocate the use of
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alternative methods in all areas of science; it is only in post-normal science, where either systems
uncertainties or decision stakes are high, that they appear to support an extension of the peer
community. It would seem, however, that once the community has been extended to incorporate
all stakeholders, then these participants should also remain for every discussion, even when
uncertainty and the decision stakes involved are lower. If new policy challenges stem from a
growing sense of uncertainty, is it possible to divide concerns into separate groups of core
science, applied science, and post-normal science? The designation of “post-normal” science
would appear to be more of an all-encompassing category for contemporary environmental
problems, not just merely one category among many.
In her discussion of a new social contract for science, Jane Lubchenco also envisions a
new type of science for handling global environmental challenges. Lubchenco, however, focuses
mainly on the scientific community itself and not on the incorporation of additional stakeholders
in the decision-making process. This seems to imply that the scientific community can still fix
the problems of society so long as scientists acknowledge society‟s changing needs. Posing the
question of whether or not the same scientific enterprise that has met past challenges is prepared
to meet the new challenges that lie in the future, Lubchenco makes the case that the current
enterprise of science is, in fact, not prepared to meet the challenges that lie ahead. She asserts
that the new issues we now face “have not been fully appreciated nor properly acknowledged by
the community of scientists whose responsibility it is, and will be, to meet them (Lubchenco,
1998, p. 491). The main conclusions that Lubchenco draws are that the roles of science have not
changed; the needs of society have altered dramatically and the growing human dominance over
the planet requires new types of knowledge and applications from science. Knowledge to inform
33

policy and management decisions is seen as one of the most important applications of modern
science; however, Lubchenco‟s argument appears to reinforce the divide between the scientific
community and society instead of creating an open space for collective discourse on society‟s
needs. For instance, the new contract is predicated on the assumptions that scientists “will
address the most urgent needs of society…communicate their knowledge and understanding in
order to inform decisions of individuals and institutions…and exercise good judgment”
(Lubchenco, 1998, p. 495).
Although recognizing the presence of uncertainty and the seriousness of today‟s
environmental problems, Lubchenco reinforces Latour‟s (2004) disconcerting criticism that
modern scientists attempt to serve as a bridge between reality and the Cave. Scientists address
society‟s needs in proportion to their importance and then communicate their knowledge to
individuals and institutions. Yet the question that remains is who decides which needs are
important? Is it the scientific community itself, relating back to Kuhn‟s assertion that science
follows the path of paradigms? Or is the direction of scientific research decided in the political
realm? In order to truly address these uncertain environmental and social challenges, perhaps it
is necessary to have a broader community of participants included in the creation and
dissemination of knowledge.

A Reassessment of Science and its Place in Society

The bond forged between science and democracy in a growing age of uncertainty is
reflective of the separation between nature and civilization. As evidenced in the literature,
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scientists are still viewed by many as managers of environmental uncertainties and, in their
capacity as advisors, producers of knowledge about the world. Until we dissociate the sciences
from “Science,” or the “politicization of the sciences through epistemology,” we will always be
in the Cave looking at shadows on the wall while scientists perform the task of reporting back
about the state of the world (Latour, 2004, p. 10). While Lubchenco (1998) asserts that it is the
needs of society that have changed and not the roles of scientists, Bruno Latour argues that in
order to even recognize these needs, the place of scientists in society must be reconstructed.
With the goal of bringing the sciences back in to democracy, Latour offers a way to remedy the
problematic placement of science in society. In order to accomplish this task, Latour proposes a
reorganization of social functions that emphasizes the collective associations of participants in
which each of the disciplines (scientists, economists, politicians, and moralists) has a role to
play.
The current practice of political ecology, as presented by Latour, reflects a socially
constructive view of nature that can only be known through the sciences. As Latour states,
science cannot remain a mirror of the world, but must be repositioned to the very core. He
argues that “nature is the chief obstacle that has always hampered the development of public
discourse” (Latour, 2004, p. 9). Up until now, a true political ecology has not existed; the two
words have simply been placed together without rethinking the true meanings behind them. In
order to reconstruct discourse among actors and construct a collective that extends to both human
and non-human actors, we must step out of the Cave and discard “political epistemology” so that
a true discourse among actors may exist. We must abandon nature as a socially constructed idea
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and embark upon a reconstitution of the social world in which both humans and non-humans
have a voice as actors.
Science in its politicized form is what has fueled the call for a separation of its influence
from society. Feyerabend views expert scientific opinion as exemplary of the perversion of
unanimity in the scientific community where “dissenters are suppressed or remain silent to
preserve the reputation of science as a source of trustworthy and almost infallible knowledge”
(Feyerabend, 1978, p. 88). The problem, however, with this argument is that “the sciences” and
the politicized “Science” are viewed as one and the same; the public can no longer differentiate
between the two and therefore public discourse is in danger of being drowned out by a reliance
on scientific expert opinions. Latour, on the other hand, improves upon this argument, claiming
that the only solution to this problem is through a redefined political ecology, in which the
sciences are one of several skills that inform the collective of human and non-human actors.
Science is divided here between the politicized forms lamented by Feyerabend that encapsulates
the “ideal of the transportation of information without discussion or deformation” (Latour, 1999,
p. 258) and the second meaning of science that refers to the ability to gain access to non-human
entities through experiments and calculations. The role of the scientist is not to make or manage
these entities but to use this access to enrich their ontology. Without an extension of the
collective to include non-humans, science cannot advance; puzzles and controversies are
required by the science that remains after liberation from the political.
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Scientific Rationality and Precaution

Building from the literature on risk and uncertainty in science policymaking, it is clear to
see that there is not always a clear separation of subject and object, self and “other” when the
scientific process is incorporated into the public sphere. The issue of regulating biotechnology
presents a challenging problem because “technological innovation, while promising opportunity,
has always encountered public anxiety about its risks” (Isaac 2002: p. 125). While certain actors
may see progress in the sciences as creating greater certainty for policymaking, still others view
a blind faith in science and technology as increasing the amount of uncertainty in the modern
world system (Beck 1999). In order to address the uncertainty and potential unintended
consequences of technological innovation applied to environmental concerns, a framework of
risk assessment is often employed, weighing the costs and benefits of new policies and
employing empirical definitions of safety, “distilling risk down to a mechanistic causalconsequence model” (Isaac 2002: p. 129). Risk assessment places a large amount of faith in
science and technology to provide accurate models of harm in increasingly complex ecological
systems. This type of assessment is viewed in the U.S. regulatory arena as “sound science,” in
which decisions are made on the basis of what can be quantified, without considering what is
unknown or cannot be measured” (Tickner and Raffensperger 2001: p. 14). Scientific rationality
in this case is reflective of the domination of industrial and economic interests at the expense of
social responsiveness.
Diverging from the viewpoint that science can resolve the issues of modernization, a
precautionary approach advocates “taking precautionary action before scientific certainty of
cause and effect” (Tickner and Raffensperger 2001: p. 4). This type of approach recognizes
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uncertainty and admits that there are limitations to the scientific process. As a risk management
tool, the precautionary approach focuses more on speculative risks, “for which a risk assessment
cannot be performed” (Isaac 2002: p. 143). This type of risk management tool is also much
more inclusive of public concerns and perceptions and is not confined to an elite group of
scientists to determine what kind of risk is acceptable in the name of progress. The regulatory
policies of GM food in the United States and the European Union reflect the differences in these
two approaches to accounting for uncertainty in science and technological innovation.
Nevertheless, while the approaches to regulating GM food may differ across the Atlantic Ocean,
it is clear that both approaches still place an instrumental value on nature and are more concerned
with the effects of this new technology on human health and industrial productivity instead of
harboring a concern for what it means to manipulate nature and bypass the process of evolution.

The Case Study Approach

To illustrate the different interpretations of scientific knowledge and uncertainty in the
political sphere, a study of the United States‟ and the European Union‟s regulatory policies
concerning GMOs is employed here. By examining the subtle differences in each case‟s
approach to the genetic manipulation of nature, one can see the vacillation of authority between
science and the public in environmental policymaking. While the United States initially
employed a precautionary approach to environmental matters, the approach to new technology
and its products was drastically altered during the period of deregulation in the 1980s. For
example, in 1974 a group of scientists in the United States “called for a temporary moratorium
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on research involving genetic engineering,” however this initial support for precautionary policy
was soon undermined once the commercial potential of biotechnology was realized (Lynch and
Vogel 2001). The European Union, on the other hand, reflects a more social democratic
approach to environmental regulation in which public participation and concern is included in
the risk management process. Nevertheless, while the EU‟s precautionary approach to GMO
regulation emphasizes a greater concern for its citizens‟ health, the regulatory policy employed
still ignores the fact that by modifying these organisms, scientists are manipulating the very basis
of life and treating the gene pool as a tool for humanity‟s progress. It is also interesting to note
that it is only in food production that the EU diverges from the U.S. on genetic modification; the
use of this technology in medicine does not create the controversy between these two actors that
the use of this technology in food production does. This implies a potential convergence of
policy and homogenization of political goals that has previously been neglected in the prior
literature.
To provide a careful analysis of the regulatory policies concerning GMOs in these two
cases, the research employed will be restricted to the years 1996-2003. In 1996, the first exports
of GM products from the United States were shipped to the European Union, sparking an interest
in the public sphere over what type of risk was involved in the modification of food products. It
was also during this year that the United Kingdom experienced the BSE crisis, calling into
question the faith in science and technology to solve the problems of modernity (Beck 1999). It
was during this crisis that the public‟s faith in scientific authority was called into question as the
same government that had told the public that “beef was safe” later admitted to “failings in the
scientific advisory system that delayed measures that might have reduced the size of Britain's
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BSE epidemic, or limited the amount of potentially infective material entering the human food
chain” (Aldhous 2000). This time period also covers the adoption by the EU of the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety which was implemented to protect biodiversity from the potential risks
resulting from biotechnology. The Cartagena Protocol references a precautionary approach to
the biotechnology process as advocated by Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, stating that “Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living
modified organism (LMO) on biodiversity…shall not prevent a Party of import from taking a
decision…in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects” (Article 10.6, Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety). Each case study examined will explain in depth the changes in
regulatory policy concerning GMOs, reflecting a scientific or social rationality toward
policymaking as well as address the differences in public opinion and media coverage. The
research will not only illustrate the subtle differences in conceptions of science and technology
for policy but to also show the convergence of ways of thinking about nature as both approaches
still emphasize the nature/civilization dualism.
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CHAPTER THREE: EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS
The European Union views GMOs as non-natural constructions that necessitate a
separate law regulating these organisms compared to natural plants. The 1990 Directive
(90/220) on the “Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms”
states that GMOs are “organisms in which the genetic material has been altered in such a way
that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination” (Official Journal of the
European Communities 1990: p. 15). Most policy debates in the European Union have been
framed in terms of potential risks to human health, however, and not necessarily in terms of the
effects of genetic manipulation on the environment. This presents an interesting development
because it places the precautionary approach of EU regulation in the same arena as the risk
assessment approach of U.S. regulation in that both regimes advocate an instrumental view of
nature, a continuation of the nature/civilization divide. Many Europeans‟ concerns about
advances in biotechnology actually seem to stem from a widespread lack of trust in democratic
institutions and not necessarily in the science behind these innovations (Europe Ambivalent on
Biotechnology 1997). Nevertheless, the regulatory regime employed by the European Union
does offer a more restrained approach to advancing the industrialization and commodification of
nature, even if the values behind this approach are utilitarian in their construction.
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The Precautionary Principle and the EU Regulatory Regime
The European approach to GMO regulation attempts to achieve a balance between
progress and precaution. Although normally related to hazardous chemicals and pollution
(Quijano 2003; Tickner 2003), several essential elements found in the precautionary principle
also apply to scientific advances in biotechnology. The principles of prevention, reverse onus,
and the view of uncertainty as a threat and not a benefit are all applicable to the regulatory policy
of GMOs. The precautionary principle is not, in fact, unscientific or reflective of a radical
ideology (contra DeGregori 2001); the evaluation process of precaution actually incorporates a
greater amount of scientific evidence than a risk assessment approach which only takes into
account hypothetical risks and not those of a speculative nature. The “intellectual linchpin” of
the EU position on GM product regulation is in fact based on the presence of scientific
uncertainty; because the risks of GM food products are imperfectly known, the EU position is
often that it is “impossible to attach science-based probabilities to [the risks]” and that “scientific
risk-based assessments of GMOs is not currently possible” (Chambers and Melkonyan 2007: p.
520). The scientific uncertainty alluded to in the European Union‟s precautionary approach
refers back to the problems on uncertainty discussed by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990; 1993) in
that these uncertainties arise from hazards that cannot be assessed accurately in the current risk
assessment framework. It is the presence of scientific uncertainty and not a scientific risk
assessment that is crucial to the debate over proper GMO regulation.
One key element in the use of the precautionary principle for GMO regulation is
unrestricted information. While the risk assessment paradigm “accepts confidentiality of
information to protect corporate proprietary rights, the application of the precautionary principle
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requires full disclosure and accessibility of information” thereby rendering it a more open,
democratic process of protection against the risks of technology (Quijano 2003: p. 25). As
described by the European Commission, the precautionary approach to GMO regulation is a
three stage process involving a trigger stage, a decision stage and a selection stage (Carr 2002).
For the precautionary principle to be considered, potential harm to the environment or human
health must be identified; “if the scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain and
there are reasonable grounds for concern, then the precautionary principle may be invoked (Carr
2002: pp. 33-34). While the trigger stage for considering the precautionary principle is grounded
in science, the decision to actually adopt the precautionary principle is purely political.
Policymakers must balance the concerns of industry with the well-being of citizens and the
environment. If policymakers decide to adopt the principle, then the next stage involves the
selection of appropriate measures, such as a measure that is legally binding or simply a decision
to inform the public of possible hazardous impacts from/of the specific product. As Susan Carr
(2002) argues, it is in the political stage, the decision on whether or not to adopt the principle,
that many of the subjective and value-based aspects are introduced. The Western European
tradition of social welfarism (Kleinman and Kinchy 2003) encompasses a wider range of social
values on which policy can be based. It is also important to note that in the European
perspective, it is the process of genetic modification of food that needs to be regulated and not
simply the product of biotechnology as reflected in U.S. regulatory policy (Jasanoff 2005). This
regulatory regime also reflects a different view of agriculture, one that is not solely focused on
industrial production. Europeans do not view agriculture as only an industry; in Europe,
agriculture “fulfills a multifunctional role, including supporting the rural way of life, preserving
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the culture and heritage of the countryside, ensuring the welfare of animals, and protecting the
environment” (Isaac 2002: p. 205). European consumers have also faced several food crises,
including the BSE crisis in the UK (Aldhous 2000), a critical event that signaled a loss of trust in
the capacity of government to protect its citizens.
With its policy developments during the 1980s, the European Union regulatory regime
actually incorporated aspects of both the scientific rationality and social rationality paradigms of
Isaac‟s (2002) risk framework. This not only reflects different views within the EU‟s member
states but also reflects different views within the 40 Directorates-General (DGs) that make up the
European Commission, the regulatory institution of the European Union (European Commission
2009). The major DGs that influence the regulatory policy concerning GMOs are Industry (DG
III), Agriculture (DG VI), Science, Research and Technology (DG XII), Environment (DG XI)
and, at times, Consumer (DG XXIV), but usually only in a supportive capacity. This fragmented
approach to policymaking allows for a much wider participation in the creation of environmental
regulation. The Viehoff Report, published in 1986, presented the first European Communitywide set of directives intended to create harmonization in the regulatory process of GM products
and prevent unilateral action among the member states. The different ideological and
philosophical viewpoints emerged at this time as the decision-making process in the European
Community implemented both a horizontal and vertical approach to regulation. The different
Directorates-General exhibited elements of both commercial and industrial objectives as well as
the social dimensions of biotechnology. The Industry, Agriculture and Science DirectoratesGeneral all supported the scientific-rationality paradigm, placing an emphasis on economic
interests. However, this does not mean that they did not stake an interest in protecting the
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environment or ensuring the safety of human health, rather “they simply perceived that the
potential risks or hazards were from products, not from technology and that the regulatory focus
should be on the…product” (Isaac 2002: p. 212) thus echoing the same regulatory philosophy of
the United States. The Environment and Consumer Directorates-General, on the other hand,
favored the social rationality approach to regulation, arguing that the precautionary principle
should be employed in order to protect the interests of consumers and the environment.

Directive 90/2202 and a Shift from Facilitating the Market to Protecting the Environment

While previous legislative directives (up to and including Directive 90/219) had been
focused on health and the environment from the contained use of GM products, the Directive
90/220, passed in April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically
modified organisms, was intended to provide a more comprehensive regulatory regime.
Deliberate release in this case refers to:
“Any intentional introduction into the environment of a genetically
modified organism or a combination of genetically modified
organisms without provision for containment such as physical
barriers or a combination of physical barriers together with
chemical or biological barriers used to limit their contact with the
general population and environment” (Ryland 2001: p. 5)

What is interesting about the development of this Directive is that only the Environment
Directorate-General (DG XI) was responsible for developing the language of this legislation;
unlike previous pieces of legislation, Industry (DG III) was not involved in the development of
2

See Appendix for the full text of Directive 90/220
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this new Directive. The legislation on the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment was
intended to provide a “process-based, regulatory oversight, ensuring uniform internal-market
conditions while promoting human and environmental health in all member states” (Isaac 2002:
p. 215). Approval for the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment would now require
the involvement of the designated authorities in the EU member states. If the member states
were not able to reach an agreement about approval, then the decision would be deferred to the
European Commission. Once a product is approved for use and is placed on the market, then it
may be used without further notification throughout the European Union, and no restrictions can
be made by member states. Nevertheless, if a member state has “justifiable reasons to consider
that the product constitutes a risk to human health,” then that state, upon informing the
Commission, may provisionally restrict the use of that product on its territory (Ryland 2001: p.
5).
With the introduction of Directive 90/220, the products of GMOs now faced a more
stringent vertical and horizontal regulation before they could be released to the market. One
similarity that this new legislation had with previous Directives, however, is that once a GM
product is approved, it cannot be restricted by individual members. This Council Directive was
met with a large amount of criticism from the scientific community as well as industry. The
scientific community argued that scientific rationality should prevail over social rationality and
that this directive would provide an unneeded burden to the scientific research process. What is
interesting about these criticisms is that, in response to this negative reaction from industry,
science, and its trade partners, The European Commission made amendments to the Directive
90/220 that were more focused on competitiveness and the internal market. These amendments
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were then challenged by critics of biotechnology who argued that this new legislative language
placed too little emphasis on the social dimensions and did not include provisions for public
dissemination of information or inclusion in the decision-making process.
The first amendment to Directive 90/220 was Commission Directive 94/15/EC which
was enacted in April 1994 (European Commission 1994). This amendment was created with the
intention of increasing the focus of the initial Directive on European competitiveness in the
biotechnology market and on enhancing the internal market structure of the European member
states. Although these laws initially had a focus on precaution and restraint, the evolution of the
European Council Directives shows a clear influence by industrial powers even though the
Environment Directorate-General was gaining an increasing amount of legislative power in the
Commission during this time. The initial position of the 90/220 Directive did not address the
issue of labeling for GM products but was soon forced to address the issue once the first GM
varieties of soybeans arrived from North America in 1996. Prior to this event, mandatory
labeling was “only necessary when the final product [had] been substantially modified” (Isaac
2002: p. 220). Reaction by consumer groups and NGOs to this simple labeling initiative
prompted the creation of the Novel Foods Regulation in 1997. The intent of this regulatory
initiative was to broaden the current regulatory oversight to include products derived from GM
material and not just products containing GM materials. This product-based regulation was
supplemental to the 90/220 Directive which still remained in control of safety assessment. This
supplemental regulation was concerned with foods whose nutritional value had been
significantly changed in the production process. These products were required to be labeled, in
which the label must include how the product had been changed, any ingredients that may affect
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health and the presence of a GMO in order to assuage consumer concerns (Isaac 2002; Ryland
2001). The Novel Foods Regulation together with Directive 90/220 and Directive 90/219 are the
three principal forms of legislation that deal with GM crops in the European Union; however
each member state has a supplemental regulatory process that has some room to maneuver within
the European Commission‟s regulatory legislation. The evolution of these three regulatory laws
not only provides insight into the decentralized structure of decision-making in the European
Union, but also illustrates the more open, democratic process of regulatory oversight in this
region that attempts to be attentive to consumer concerns and public opinion. Reception to
biotechnology in the European Union tends to be more skeptical of and even at times ambivalent
toward scientific authority and scientific methods for risk assessment. Part of this may be due to
distrust in government institutions to protect its citizens, but could also represent a different
system of values that differentiates the European reaction to GMOs with the lack of reaction to
GMOs in the United States.

Public Opinion and Attitudes toward Food Technology

Many Europeans express uneasiness about biotechnology processes and products. While
there is evidence of differences in opinion concerning GM food across member countries in the
European Union, public perception of genetically modified food in Europe tends to be negative
(Gaskell et al. 1999). Genetically modified food is often associated with unintended
consequences and long term risks for human health and the environment. There is also the
presence of moral and ethical concerns which tend to influence perception toward GMOs (Miles
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et al. 2005). In many cases, the public recognizes that there may be potential benefits associated
with biotechnology and GM food. The perception of these products, however, often rests on
who receives these benefits and whether specific benefits of these products are actually desired.
When genetically modified soya was introduced into the European food supply in 1996, there
were no traceability mechanisms or labeling processes in place, meaning that consumers were
“unable to choose whether or not to consume genetically-modified foods” (Miles et al. 2005: p.
247). There often seems to be a disconnect in thinking between the traditional concerns of
regulators (risk and safety) and the concerns of the public in the EU which tend to focus on
moral acceptability.
Conventional wisdom would lead one to believe that knowledge is correlated with
support for science and technology. The more the public are informed about a particular process
or innovation, the more likely they are to be supportive of the products stemming from advances
in science and technology. However, an examination of several Eurobarometer studies in the
1990s (Nature 1997) implies that although the public‟s knowledge of relevant basic science
increased, optimism about the contribution of biotechnology and the beneficial nature of
advances made by genetic engineering actually declined. More knowledge does not always lead
to greater public acceptance.
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Figure 1: Biotechnology Knowledge in the EU
Source: Eurobarometer 52.1 The Europeans and Biotechnology March 2000

As illustrated in Figure 1, Europeans‟ knowledge of the subject of human cloning rose
significantly during the three year period 1996-1999. The Eurobarometer survey asked a series
of true/false questions on different genetics and biotechnology subjects where each respondent
could answer “true,” “false,” or “don‟t know.” While the percentage of respondents who could
accurately recognize that “the cloning of human beings results in perfectly identical descendants”
(Eurobarometer 52.1) rose from 46 percent to 64 percent, the knowledge questions that were
asked concerning the potential of biotechnology reflect a continued uncertainty in public
attitudes toward this technology. The “animals” subject was addressed by asking respondents
whether or not genetically modified animals are always larger than ordinary animals. The
number of correct responses for this category actually dropped over the three year period from
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36 percent to 34 percent. The number of respondents who were unsure of the answer (those
responding “don‟t know”) rose during this period from 30 percent to 38 percent. For the
“tomatoes” subject, respondents were asked to determine the validity of the statement: “ordinary
tomatoes do not contain genes, while genetically modified tomatoes do” (Eurobarometer 52.1).
The percentage of respondents who were able to correctly answer this question remained
unchanged from 1996 to 1999 at 35 percent. The percentage of respondents who answered
incorrectly, however, increased from 30 percent to 35 percent during this period. This could
imply that Europeans are unsure or confused about the technology concerning genetic
modification of food. While on the one hand, European respondents‟ knowledge and comfort
with the subject of human cloning significantly increased from the 1996 to the 1999 survey, the
genetics of food and crop modification still elicit a sense of uncertainty among the public. The
last subject category addressed was gene transfers, specifically whether or not it is impossible to
transfer animal genes to plants. The majority of respondents in 1999 (47%) were unsure about
this subject and were unable to ascertain the validity of this statement. The percentage of
respondents who correctly answered this question on the biotechnology quiz dropped slightly
from 27 percent in 1996 to 26 percent in 1999, though not at a significant rate. A more telling
development here is that the percentage of respondents who did not know whether or not this
was possible increased during this time period, meaning that the uncertainty surrounding genetic
modification and gene transfers has influenced the regulatory policy in the EU which emphasizes
the consumer‟s right to know about GM products. This concern, however, does not extend to the
potential consequences for the natural world of modifying the basis of life in plants or animals; it
merely touches upon the risk to human health and the usefulness of this technology to improve
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human life, not improve biodiversity or the natural world. While European attitudes may address
specific moral concerns about biotechnology and its products, these concerns remain nested in an
anthropocentric framework which does not seem to consider nature as an actor in determining
whether or not this type of technology is truly beneficial.
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Figure 2: European Attitudes Toward Biotechnology
Source: Eurobarometer 52.1 The Europeans and Biotechnology March 2000

The 1999 Eurobarometer survey included a basic biotechnology quiz to determine the
level of knowledge that respondents had regarding genetics and biotechnology. Along with this
index of biotechnology knowledge, respondents were also surveyed on their perception of
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biotechnology and genetic modification in specific industrial applications. Figure 2 illustrates
the changing perception of biotechnology from the mid-1990s to the end of the decade. While
respondents‟ knowledge of basic genetic practices increased as illustrated by the human cloning
question from Figure 1 above, their perception of biotechnology applications follows a consistent
pattern. As clearly shown by this data, in 1999, respondents viewed the use of biotechnology in
genetic testing and medicinal applications as less risky than they viewed it in 1996.
Nevertheless, in the applications of crop plants and food production, the respondents viewed the
use of biotechnology as riskier in these areas in 1999 than they did in 1996. This also coincides
with research undertaken by Gaskell et al. (2001) which showed trans-Atlantic support for
biotechnology in the use of genetic testing and medicines, but a clear divergence between the
United States and the European Union in crops and food production. Europeans do not clearly
oppose all forms of genetic manipulation; the trans-Atlantic divide “appears to be limited to the
„green biotechnologies‟” (Gaskell et al. 2001, p. 108). The “green biotechnologies” in this case
consist of GM foods and crops. The authors here make a clear distinction between this type of
biotechnology application and the “red” biotechnologies which consist of genetic testing and
medicine. The key point here is to understand that the negative European public perception of
biotechnology focuses on GM food and crops and not on the entire process of genetic
manipulation; the concern for public health and safety is illustrative of the precautionary
approach initially implemented by European regulators and appears to mainly center on the
uncertainty of GM food production and the process it entails.
It has been claimed (Bauer 1995) that the mismatches between the scientific and public
assessments of risk are responsible for public resistance to new technologies. Respondents in the
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1996 Eurobarometer survey who had concerns about gene technology were found to think
“principally in terms of moral acceptability rather than risk – a significant difference from the
way in which experts normally judge the acceptability of new technologies” (Gaskell et al. 1999,
p. 385). Supporters of gene technology view this technology as useful, morally acceptable and
something that should be encouraged whereas opponents of gene technology view this
technology as risky and morally unacceptable.

Table 1: Common Logic for Responses to Gene Technology in the EU
Patterns of Response

Supporters

Risk-Tolerant Supporters

Opponents

Useful

Yes

Yes

No

Risky

No

Yes

Yes

Morally Acceptable

Yes

Yes

No

Encouraged

Yes

Yes

No

Source: Gaskell et al. (1999)

It is possible that the difference between scientific perceptions of risk and public perception of
risk in biotechnology rests on the notion of benefits. Who benefits from biotechnological
applications? In the fields of genetic testing and medicine development, there is a clear benefit
to be had for society. However, the genetic modification of crops and the manipulation of genes
in food production pose higher risks than benefits. Whether it is due to an increasing amount of
uncertainty surrounding the food production process (stemming from the 1996 BSE crisis in the
UK) or the desire to know what scientists have altered in a product placed on the market for
consumption, gene technology applied to food and plants is not seen as a benefit to society by the
European public. The regulatory progression toward acceptance of these products, with the
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addition of labels that identify it as a GM food, has largely been determined by a push toward
convergence on GMO regulation in the international community. The focus in the United States
on the substantial equivalence of GM products to conventionally produced products has
influenced the international community to converge on slowly accepting the unnatural
manipulation of genes for an increase in crop yields and a more efficient food production
process.
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CHAPTER FOUR: U.S. REGULATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED
ORGANISMS
The key document that guides the regulation of genetically modified organisms in the
United States is the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (1986) which
describes the Federal system for evaluating the products of biotechnology. This framework is a
coordinated, “risk-based system to ensure new biotechnology are safe for the environment and
human health” (United States Regulatory Agencies Unified Biotechnology 2009). The U.S.
government agencies that are responsible for the regulation of genetically modified products are
the U.S. Department of Agriculture‟s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDAAPHIS), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Health and
Human Service‟s Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Depending on the characteristics of the
specific product, one or more of these agencies may provide oversight on the product‟s
development. One key attribute to note is that in the United States, as opposed to the regulatory
structure of the EU, the regulation of biotechnology is focused on the end product, not the
process of manipulating the DNA structure of animals and plants. The Coordinated Framework
is insistent that “organisms produced through genetic engineering are no different form
organisms produced from traditional breeding techniques (Toke 2007: p. 408). Even though the
process of creating genetically modified foods is different from traditional agricultural practices,
the end products are viewed as one and the same. The FDA‟s 1992 GM Food guidelines state
that GM foods are no different from their conventional equivalents, and because of this they do
not present a safety concern (FDA 1992).
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The Division of Responsibilities in U.S. Regulation

In the U.S. regulatory structure, the USDA is responsible for environment assessments of
plant risk and for regulating the import and interstate movement of GM plants. APHIS examines
organisms and products that are altered or produced through the genetic engineering process that
are or have the potential to be harmful to plants (Isaac 2002). Under the Plant Protection Act, the
USDA-APHIS has regulatory oversight over biotechnology products that could pose a pest risk
to plants. In this regard, the regulatory structure does concern itself with the process of genetic
engineering but only in an elementary capacity. In fact, the regulatory procedures of APHIS
have been simplified twice, once to de-list six GM varieties and once to speed up the application
review for a non-regulated status to GM plants. Concerning the regulation of GM food products,
the Food and Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), housed within the USDA, is responsible for
ensuring the safety and proper labeling of products that are prepared from domestic livestock.
Any food animals that are subject to the techniques of biotechnology would fall under the
jurisdiction of the FSIS. According to the language of the Coordinated Framework, the FSIS
“anticipates that many food animals which are subject to the new techniques of biotechnology
will not differ substantially in appearance, behavior, or general health from currently inspected
cattle, sheep, swine, goats, equines and poultry” (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1986,
p. 110). This statement allows the FSIS to incorporate the same inspection and regulation
procedures that they would for any traditional food animal inspections. The framework allows
for the fact that certain genetically engineered animals may differ substantially from animals
currently inspected; however, a decision on how to proceed in the inspection and regulation
process would not be made until the time at which these animals become part of the food
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production process. Instead of making amendments now to the regulatory structure, the policy
according to this framework is one of adaptation as needed, which fits in with the scientific
rationality paradigm of regulatory politics. The scientific rationality approach relies on the
rationality of empirical questions and adheres to a faith in technological progress, not precaution.
Actual risk is separated from perceived risk in GM crop regulation. For the United States, the
key determinant in altering the regulation of GM crops and food products is whether a risk exists
and the likelihood that this risk will occur. As noted above in the regulatory language for the
FSIS inspection process, until genetically engineered animals differ significantly from their
traditional counterparts in appearance, behavior or general health, the risk is perceived as
equivalent to that of traditional food animals in the industrial food production process.
The EPA is responsible for the environmental release of bioengineered pesticides and
bioengineered plants with pesticide characteristics, such as Bt corn and Bt cotton. A processbased focus is initially employed to determine crops that fall within the EPA‟s jurisdiction;
however, a “scientific-rationality approach is used in the risk-assessment stage…in order to
determine novelty” (Isaac 2002: p. 185; Jasanoff 1995). The switch from a process-based
approach to risk management to a more product-based approach is indicative of the desire by
industrial powers to give the appearance that the process involved in gene modification is no
different than ordinary measures of crop and food production, especially since farmers have been
creating hybrid plants for years. The difference, however, lies in the industrial modification
through the use of technological processes to fundamentally alter the genetic structure of these
plants and food products. Inserting foreign genes into a plant should be considered different
from creating a new species of plant from two naturally occurring plant species. During the
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comment period before the Coordinated Framework was implemented, many of those submitting
comments expressed concern that the EPA was relating an organisms‟ risk potential to the
process by which it was created and not on the product itself. Those offering comments
suggested that “the process by which an organism was modified was too indirect as an indicator
of its newness” (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1986, p. 39). The comments received
by the EPA indicated that there should not be a differentiation between the process of genetic
engineering and other industrial processes. The process-based approach that the EPA initially
wanted to implement in its oversight of biotechnology products was believed to be “an
insufficient indicator of risk, because genetic engineering processes do not necessarily produce
organisms that present risks, nor are non-engineered organisms necessarily safe” (Office of
Science and Technology Policy 1986, p. 39). One important series of comments that were
submitted to the EPA during this time referenced the possibility of market distortion. A processbased approach would single out specific production techniques for regulation thus causing the
more traditional techniques to be favored at the expense of newer, scientifically advanced
techniques that could be just as safe as or even safer than the traditional production techniques.
The possibility of market distortion is important to highlight here in order to emphasize the
economic perspective that encompasses the U.S. regulatory structure for GM products. This
economic perspective serves to reiterate the scientific rationality paradigm that best describes the
set of values and attitudes toward the genetic modification of nature for industrial profit. The
EPA of course does take responsibility for examining the environmental impact of these
processes but the agency is limited in the scope of its regulatory oversight to different
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applications in the industrial agriculture process, such as pesticides and herbicides, and is not
responsible for regulating the production of specific plants or food products.
The FDA has the responsibility over ensuring food safety and the safety of crops that are
used for feed in the industrial agriculture system. As described in the Coordinated Framework:
“A small but important expanding fraction of the products the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulates represents the fruits of new technological
achievements. These achievements are in areas as diverse as polymer chemistry,
molecular biology, and micro-miniaturization. Although there are no statutory
provisions or regulations that address biotechnology specifically, the laws and
regulations under which the agency approves products place the burden of
proof…on the manufacturer. The agency possesses extensive experience with
these regulatory mechanisms and applies them to the products of biotechnological
processes.” (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1986, p. 24)

By examining this language, it is clear that the same regulatory procedures placed on ordinary,
normal products by the FDA are also being used to regulate the products of biotechnology. The
language incorporated into the Coordinated Framework emphasizes the achievements of
technology and places the area of examination on the product and not the process by which it
was created. Nowhere in this language do the issues of the ethics of genetic manipulation or the
potential consequences of altering the evolutionary structure of life appear.
One thing that is important to note is that FDA consultation is not mandatory but is only
recommended prior to the market release of GM food and feeds. This is due to the fact that the
FDA does not differentiate between the end products of GM food and food that is produced
using traditional methods of agriculture. According to the FDA, the focus of oversight should be
on the novelty of food plants, not on the use of biotechnology (FDA 1992). Biotechnologybased products are to only be brought under FDA jurisdiction if they are determined to be a food
additive according to the Federal Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA).
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Table 2: Summary of U.S. Regulatory Agency Approval Structure
Summary: Approval of Commercial Biotechnology Products
Subject
Responsible Agency(ies)
Foods/Food Additives
FDA
FSIS (division of Dept. of Agriculture)
Human Drugs, Medical Devices, and
Biologics
FDA
Animal Drugs
FDA
APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Animal Biologics
Service)
Other Contained Uses
EPA
Plants and Animals
APHIS
FSIS
FDA
Pesticides Released into the Environment
EPA
Source: U.S. Office of Science and Technology

Scientific Rationality and the Economic Perspective
The scientific rationality framework provides stability and a sense of predictability for the
U.S. biotechnology industry. With its emphasis on technological progress and efficiency, it
makes sense that the regulatory submission process is straightforward and consists of a minimum
number of barriers for acceptance of a product. An example of this efficiency and predictability
is illustrated by Monsanto‟s compliance efforts in the mid-1990s in seeking approval for its GM
potato. This particular Russet potato variety, called the NewLeaf potato, was developed to be
resistant to the Colorado potato beetle. The NewLeaf potato uses naturally occurring bacteria
called Bacillus thuringiensis to provide protection against the Colorado potato beetle in the plant
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(Monsanto 2009). As an example of U.S. efficiency in the GM product approval process, the
Monsanto case illustrates the trend of high rates of approval with few regulatory blockages. The
Monsanto strategy in the case of its GM potato consisted of two phases. The first phase of their
strategy was to establish the fact that the GM potato was equivalent to traditional varieties of
potatoes and therefore should not be subject to novelty regulations (Isaac 2002). The second
strategy that Monsanto employed was to provide the correct data that was needed on the human,
animal, and environmental safety of the product. The certainty and predictability of the GM
regulatory process in the United States allows biotechnology companies to know what types of
hurdles they will encounter and the type of risk assessment information that they should present
in order to gain approval for market release. These firms favor the regulatory approach of the
United States and have been able to push for this type of approach in the international
community via the World Trade Organization and its dispute resolution process. The scientific
rationality approach benefits economic interests through its predictable framework and narrow
conception of risk that encourages technological progress at the expense of potential
environmental harm, a consequence that, under this paradigm, would only require action or
adaptation upon its occurrence.
GM crop regulatory submissions in the United States require three types of information
to proceed through the acceptance process for market approval. The biotechnology firm that has
developed the GM product in question must submit information on the genetic characteristics of
the host and recipient organisms, “the vector of transfer employed” in the creation of the product,
and information on the genetic characteristics of the final product created by the transfer (Isaac
2002, p. 192). The second type of information that is required is information on the method of
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data collection and procedures used for the field trials. The third type of information that must
be submitted for market approval of the GM product is the location of the field trial and the
supervision procedures that were employed in the field trials. Once a biotechnology firm has
gone through this process successfully and has received approval for a GM crop variety, “the
only regulatory responsibility is an annual field-trial report” (Isaac 2002, p. 192). The U.S.
regulatory approach for GM products is indeed a commercially friendly approach. Between
1988 and 1998, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) received more than 920
requests for the environmental release of GM crop varieties. Of these 920 requests, 886 were
approved. Also during this time period, APHIS received 65 petitions for deregulation of certain
GM varieties; only 5 were rejected.
The product-focused scientific rationality approach employed in the United States is one
that is based on the application of biotechnology processes and one that employs a principle of
substantial-equivalence, as illustrated in the language of the Coordinated Framework (1986),
instead of viewing all GM crops as novel products. This product-based approach is much more
likely to be favored by biotechnology firms and industrial actors whose sole responsibility is to
ensure that their GM product is equivalent to a product created through traditional means. The
fact that the DNA structure in many cases has been altered would seem to render this
equivalence invalid. Nevertheless, the process by which the new GM product was created and
the possible ecological impacts incurred are never called into question by the regulatory
agencies. This type of regulatory framework favors economic responsibility over that of social
responsibility. The fact that a product that has had its genetic structure fundamentally altered can
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be considered “equivalent” to one that has grown in a conventional method attests to this focus
on the market and economic progress.
Similarities or Differences in Regulatory Approaches?

The regulatory process concerning biotechnology in the United States differs from the
European Union in that it employs a very narrow range of participation in the process. Experts
perform the risk assessments, either federal regulators or the risk-assessment personnel of the
proponent GM-crop developer like Monsanto, and the decision making power rests with a small
group of scientists, government bureaucrats and members of industry. As described in the
example of the Monsanto GM potato, many biotechnology firms are responsible for performing
the risk assessment and then forwarding that information to the applicable U.S. regulatory
agency. Most often, these risk assessments are adequate for the approval process, a process that
tends to favor industrial firms and technological progress. It can be argued that these actors all
have a vested interest for the most part in the growth of the genetic engineering industry.
However, despite the narrow participation in the decision-making process, there does exist the
opportunity for public comment on draft policies. This would require though that citizens are
concerned enough with the genetic engineering process to submit comments on these draft
proposals and monitor the Federal Register for these announcements as well.
When the policies of the Coordinated Framework were first drafted by the relevant U.S.
agencies, public comments were solicited. In the case of the USDA‟s regulatory policy toward
GM crops and food, the agency received comments from 102 respondents, the majority of which
were from either business or academia. The comments on the nature of modern biotechnology
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products are telling in that they illustrate the apparent lack of concern that most respondents had
toward the alteration of life‟s building blocks to produce a more efficient product. Only three
respondents felt that “genetic engineering across species barriers did create a potentially different
product and the possibility of unique ecological effects” (Office of Science and Technology
Policy 1986, p. 113). Only seven respondents (6 percent) commented on the topic of risk
assessment and risk analysis. Comments on risk assessment and a risk/benefit analysis of
biotechnology applications ranged from a recommendation that standard methodologies be
applied by all agencies for risk assessment to warnings against attempting the regulate the
imaginary dangers of genetic engineering and recombinant DNA techniques. Comments
received by the FDA and the EPA regarding policies toward GM crop and food production
followed a similar pattern, with the majority of comments emanating from the business and
academic world. It would appear from these comments that there is a greater trust in science and
technology in the United States, or at least a greater amount of trust in government to apply the
correct amount of regulation to the products of genetic engineering.
One additional dimension to U.S. regulatory development of GMOs rests with the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) which assesses proposed U.S. regulations and legislation to
ensure that new regulations will generate desired outcomes. These evaluations support the
scientific rationality approach in that the OMB‟s approach limits stakeholder engagement in the
risk-management process because “such involvement can potentially distort the regulatory
development beyond the goal of correcting market failure” (Isaac 2002: p. 188). The OMB
evaluations support a risk assessment process that is based on hypothetical risks only, not
speculative risks that are more adapted to a precautionary approach. The OMB is only
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concerned with focusing on safety and hazards and not on assuaging public fear and concerns.
This type of regulatory structure differs greatly from the EU regulatory framework which adds a
political dimension into the prevailing paradigm, rendering not only a responsibility to economic
development, but also a responsibility to the public realm. One of the largest differences
between the two regulatory frameworks is the range of participation that is allowed in the
process of creating and implementing regulatory policy for GM crops and food products. While
the United States employs a narrow range of participation, following the scientific rationality
paradigmatic structure, the EU allows for a wider participation in regulatory approaches to
genetic engineering. Causes for this difference may rest with media coverage as certain authors
(Gaskell et al. 1999) have found a pattern in the type of coverage European media outlets give to
the GM controversy. Nevertheless, a greater cause for this widening participation gap across the
Atlantic seems to be the level of centralization and fragmentation of the regulatory process.
While the United States‟ regulatory regime is fragmented across agencies and even between
federal and state powers, the European Union‟s regulatory structure has become increasingly
centralized over the past decade, with the majority of decision-making resting with the European
Commission and the European Council. Individual countries still retain some leeway in
regulating products that are imported across their borders, but the bulk of policy formulation lies
within these two institutions, making it easier for citizens to know where to address their
concerns.
The rhetoric that Europe promotes a greater level of precaution in its approach to
regulation follows the social rationality paradigm that Isaac (2002) employs to differentiate the
EU framework from that of the United States. However, this paradigm does not rely solely on
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the dichotomy between progress and precaution. If this were the case, then the placement of the
United States and the European Union as having fundamentally different values and approaches
to environmental concerns would collapse. This rhetoric of a greater amount of precaution in the
European regulatory process does not fully encapsulate the reality of actual regulatory policies.
The choice of risks to regulate plays a larger role in the creation of divergence between these two
actors; “Europe appears to be more precautionary than the U.S. on some risks, such as
genetically modified foods, hormones in beef, climate change, marine pollution. The U.S.
appears to be more precautionary than Europe on other risks, such as mad cow disease…air
pollution… [and] nuclear power” (Wiener 2004, p. 90). There is precaution on both sides of the
Atlantic, but the type of risks that merit the application of precaution differs. It is also important
to note that even in the case of GM food production the EU‟s precautionary approach does not
focus on the potential ecological damage that may occur with the genetic manipulation of nature.
The precautionary approach in this case has more to do with the safety of human health than it
does the conservation of biodiversity or the moral acceptability of altering the basic structure of
life.
The most crucial difference between the EU and U.S. regulatory approaches to GMOs
lies within the labeling of GM food. Since the FDA rejects the notion that GM foods are
substantially different from their conventional food counterparts, the agency also rejects the
notion that GM food should be subject to mandatory labeling. Toke (2007) points out that while
there have been efforts by consumer and environmental groups in the United States to urge
Congress to implement mandatory labeling programs, these efforts have failed to generate
enough popular concern to push these mandates through the legislative branch. The domination
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of GM science by corporate interests in the United States and their close involvement with
government is a matter of concern for many critics of biotechnology; however, popular sentiment
seems to align itself with corporate interests, much more so than in the European Union. This
corporately organized GM regulatory system in the United States fits in well with Ulrich Beck‟s
description of the risk society, although Beck‟s concern with genetic technology more closely
aligns with contemporary European rather than U.S. concerns.
The United States has led the rest of the world in the development of a regulatory
structure for the products of biotechnology. The initial approach to regulation was driven by
scientists and was based on the desire of these scientists to proceed with caution in geneticmodification techniques (Isaac 2002). It is possible that early on, these scientists had a concern
with the genetic manipulation of nature and its unintended consequences, something that was
later erased by industrial maneuvering for profit maximization. Indeed, Ulrich Beck (1992),
arguing from a sociological perspective, regards genetic engineering to be one of the leading
technological threats to the risk society:
“Gene technology puts humankind in an almost godlike position, in which
it is able to create new materials and living creatures and revolutionise the
biological and cultural foundations of the family. This generalization of
the principle of design and constructability…exponentiates the risks and
politicizes the places, conditions and means of their origin and
interpretation.” (p. 200)
While initially concerned with this type of moral quandary, consumers in the European Union
mostly focused on the risks involved for human consumption of GM products and not on the
questions and concerns that Beck puts forth in this statement. Gene technology and the
“progress” created through this technology does place man in the position of creator. This type
of thinking re-emphasizes the human/nature divide and falsely places man in the dominant
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position over the natural world. The ability to modify the ecological structure shifts power to a
select few at the expense of future generations and ecological stability. A greater amount of
scientific knowledge in this case only serves to breed a greater amount of uncertainty for
sustainability. This uncertainty in environmental costs of GM production is largely left out of
the bulk of social concerns and moral questioning of biotechnological processes. The economic
perspective and social perspective both trump an environmental perspective in this case.
Regulatory intervention in the United States tends to follow a regulatory-independence
approach that is in line with an economic perspective. This approach to regulation describes
government regulatory intervention as something that should only occur in reaction to market
failure. In the area of modern biotechnology regulation, the U.S. system has been focused on
removing market failure in order to enhance efficiency and effectiveness, a mechanistic view in
the spirit of the dominant social paradigm (Dunlap and Van Liere 1984) which praises
efficiency, a faith in science and technology and future abundance in society. The market is
responsible for deciding the effectiveness of different regulations, an effectiveness that is based
on their ability to “facilitate technological progress while delivering an acceptable level of
safety” (Isaac 2002, p. 181). A lack of technological progress would be looked at as a failure by
the market to reward innovation. Technological progress is elevated at the behest of consensual
decision-making and a wide range of participants, the very fundamentals of democratic decisionmaking procedures. A good example of this faith in future abundance and technological
progress is the Green Revolution in which industrial agriculture practices were exported to the
developing world in an attempt to eradicate starvation and support growing populations. In this
case, however, countries like India and China are now seeing the effects of Green Revolution
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techniques in that certain natural resources, like soil quality, have been eroded due to high yield
agriculture techniques and the planting of GM seeds, many of which require a greater amount of
fertilizers and pesticides. This cycle serves to perpetuate the influence of industrial
biotechnology firms under the guise of promoting social welfare and responsibility. These cases
from the developing world provide a glimpse into the environmental consequences of genetic
engineering and GM crop proliferation; however, concurrent with the tenets of the dominant
social paradigm, many actors in the biotechnology field simply believe that adaptation to these
changes is possible.
The U.S. regulatory regime favors economic interests and scientific rationality as
opposed to the EU framework of consumer interests and social rationality. While these two
approaches may indicate a divergence in GMO regulation, the specific policies in place actually
point toward convergence in the placement of human interests over environmental interests.
While it can be argued that the European Union is more environmentally conscious of the effects
of GM products, the regulatory language invoked points to the same safety and health hazards
that the U.S. regulatory language includes. The difference is in the range of public participation
in determining which risks require more stringent regulation and which risks are acceptable in
society.
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Table 3: Comparison of Scientific Rationality and Social Rationality Paradigms
Comparison of Scientific Rationality and Social Rationality Paradigms for GMO Regulation

Scientific Rationality

Social Rationality

Regulatory Issues
Technological
Progress

Technological
Precaution

Type of Risk

Recognized

Recognized,
Hypothetical and
Speculative

Accepts Substantial Equivalence?

Yes

No

Burden of Proof

Innocent until proven
guilty; onus is on the
regulatory agencies

Guilty until proven
innocent; onus is on the
producers

Risk Tolerance

Minimum Risk

Zero Risk

Focus

Product-based

Process-based

Participation

Narrow, usually only
technical experts

Wide; social dimensions
employed; public
involvement

Mandatory Labelling

Safety or hazard based
strategy

Based on consumers'
right to know

Belief

Source: Isaac (2002)
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
The advancement of biotechnology applications and genetic engineering of plants and
food products are issues that expose not only the conflicts inherent in a dualistic understanding
of the human/nature relationship, but also the conflicts between economic and social
responsibility, and progress versus precaution. The political approach toward genetic
modification of life forms initially presents itself as following one of two paths: risk assessment
practices that favor technological progress or the implementation of precautionary measures that
favor a greater social responsibility for protecting the health and safety of citizens. However, a
closer examination of the regulatory language and public sentiment toward biotechnology
applications has illustrated that while these two competing paradigms of regulation contain
subtle differences, there are also a number of similarities that exist. Both paradigms employ a
certain level of precaution toward genetic engineering and the development of genetically
modified food and crop varieties; however, the subtle differences lie in the categories of risk that
are examined. Where the United States‟ regulatory regime relies on scientific, empirical data to
assess either current or hypothetical risks to this process, the EU‟s regulatory regime also
incorporates the category of speculative risk, employing greater precautionary measures under a
social rationality paradigm. The convergence toward acceptance of GM products indicates that
the human/nature dualism remains strong even in a regulatory system claiming to harbor
concerns about the ecological impacts of genetic engineering. Nowhere in the regulatory
language or the public reaction to this technology, however, is the case made that genetic
engineering does fundamentally alters the natural structure of these products and may in turn
provide unintended consequences damaging the ecological system. The risks of the
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modernization process, which should be incorporated in a discussion of genetic modification
procedures, are largely ignored. Emphasis is placed on human health and safety, disregarding
the non-human actors that may be affected by this type of progress.
The development of biotechnology and genetic engineering places an anthropocentric
focus on resolving environmental problems. This focus reflects the influence of the dominant
social paradigm, with its emphasis on technological progress, limited government intervention,
and a reliance on the market to resolve problems, on the decision-making process for the
manipulation of nature to promote human progress. The consequences of modernization,
although not fully realized, are not even brought into the speculative category of risks that the
European regulatory regime includes in its precautionary approach to biotechnology. The
placement of values on scientific discovery, reinforcing a separation between human and nonhuman nature, continues to promote a utilitarian, or purely instrumental approach to nature in the
cases of U.S. and EU regulation of GM products. It has been argued that the controversy
surrounding GM crops and food may be caused by “legitimate differences in value
commitments, including safety, social and ethical issues” (Myhr 2010, p. 8). While it does
appear that an examination of public sentiment in the EU leads to this conclusion, a greater
question is whether or not this view would change with an increase in knowledge of the genetic
modification process. Perhaps the differences involved are not centered on values, but on the
level of knowledge and the types of risks that are acceptable based on knowledge of these risks.
The main challenge for biotechnology regulation and the effects of this regulation on
trade in the international community rests upon the handling of scientific uncertainty that
surrounds this process. The concept of progress presupposes that more knowledge leads to less
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uncertainty. Nevertheless, in the area of GM crops, research may resolve this uncertainty but it
may also lead to the identification of new areas of uncertainty. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990;
1993) address this issue in their explication of post-normal science and the misleading nature of
quantitative data for scientific knowledge. Recall that the authors here argue that new issues of
the post-normal age differ from traditional scientific problems in that they are global in scale,
have a long-term impact, and the quantitative data on their effects is largely inadequate. The
skills required for managing these new challenges have largely been neglected due to the reliance
on the “correctness” of scientific assertions and the belief that the language of science is always
precise. Society‟s faith in statistical data opens a trap in which the quantity of data presented is
placed above the quality of data. An extension of the peer community is required in the
knowledge production process. Rather than a narrow range of participation in regulating an
industry that may promote uncertain ecological changes, there should be a wider range of
participants in the decision-making process in order to alleviate uncertainty in policy.
As the research, development, and commercialization of genetically modified crops and
seeds increases, there exists a greater need for international convergence on the regulatory
framework for these products. GM products do have potential short-term benefits to society, but
also harbor long-term ecological consequences that must be addressed by international
regulatory frameworks. It is interesting to note that the U.S. and EU regulatory regimes differ
mainly on the differentiation between process and product, and not on a concern for humans
versus concern for nature. Enclosure of the genetic commons is not once viewed as a concern
for future sustainability. Because of this, the two paradigms of scientific rationality and social
rationality are not necessarily in conflict with each other; a convergence of the two competing
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paradigms is possible, one in which public confidence is increased and consumer choice is
ensured. The labeling policies adopted by the European Union reflect this type of convergence,
whereby GM products are acceptable as long as consumers retain the right to know what they are
purchasing. The troubling aspect of this convergence is that it leads to further enclosure through
the advancement of intellectual property rights and the slow eradication of traditional knowledge
in agricultural practice. This not only holds implications for the international community as a
whole, but also greatly influences the agricultural practices of the developing world and the
ability of these countries and culture to retain that traditional knowledge in the face of industrial
homogenization.
The recent case of GM eggplant development in India illustrates a conflict that is
creeping in more and more in the agriculture systems of the developing world: conflicts arising
between the protection of crop biodiversity and the Western concept of scientific progress. In
February 2010, the Indian Minister of Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, imposed a
moratorium on genetically modified eggplant (Bt Brinjal) until it could be sufficiently
determined that this modified eggplant did not pose any risks to human and animal health and
biodiversity (Rao 2010). There is great concern in this case that this genetic alteration of the
eggplant crop will have adverse effects on the country‟s rich biodiversity. This decision was
immediately criticized by Western biotechnology firms and scientists who proclaimed that the
Indian government had based its decision on the “activist claims” that Bt Brinjal would
negatively impact ecology and biodiversity (Rao 2010). Uncertainty toward the ecological
effects of industrial practice and the genetic modification of seeds not only stems from a lack of
knowledge on the issue of GM crops but also the consequences of Green Revolution agricultural
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techniques. Farmers in the state of Punjab abandoned traditional methods of farming in the
1960s and 1970s as part of a national program backed by U.S. and international advisors. Indian
farmers then began growing crops according to the American conventional model of agriculture:
high yield seeds, chemicals and irrigation. While the short-term effects were tremendous and
actually allowed India to export some grain, the pressure to grow only high-yielding crops
instead of a traditional mixture resulted in a severe loss of irrigation capabilities. The miracle
seeds that produced higher yields also required much more water than natural rainfall provided,
forcing many farmers to dig wells and irrigate with groundwater (Zwerdling 2009). Recent
government studies in India have indicated that this use of groundwater to irrigate crops has
dropped the water table dramatically. The abandonment of traditional methods to increase
efficiency and maximize total production has now resulted in the unintended consequence of
resource destruction and an exacerbation of economic inequality. This is one consequence that
the Indian government does not wish to encounter again with the production of seeds that have
been genetically modified. It is not only a question of uncertainty, but also of the
homogenization of crop varieties and the potential consequences for the ecological system.
While providing short term gains, GM products that increase yield or provide resistance to
destructive bacteria may actually produce ecological destruction in the long term, a development
that industrialized nations must take notice of in the creation and implementation of regulatory
policy for genetic engineering practices. The Indian government has recently begun taking a
cautious approach to GM crop development, including “considering a proposal that GM crops, in
addition to passing several field trial criteria, will have to be proven to be nutritionally superior
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to their „natural‟ counterpart before they can be commercialized” (Knight and Paradkar 2008, p.
1031).
The concerns from the developing world regarding GM crop and food production focus
not only on the process of genetic manipulation but also on the final product resulting from this
manipulation. Where the U.S. regulatory regime is only concerned with the final product and
sees no difference between a GM product and a traditional product, it is both the process and the
product that must be examined to alleviate the uncertainty involved in this scientific process.
While there is always the presence of uncertainty and anomaly in scientific discovery, it is with
the processes of biotechnology that greater knowledge leads to greater uncertainty. Therefore, a
middle ground for regulating this process is needed, one in which the concerns of industrial firms
and the concerns of the public are both acknowledged. The economic perspective must be joined
with a greater social responsiveness to the citizens who consume these products. To maximize
long-term benefits and mitigate ecological damage, it is imperative that governments incorporate
non-human actors into the policy debate, taking notice of potential environmental damage and
biodiversity loss that may be incurred from human manipulation of the natural world.
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APPENDIX: COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 90/220/EEC
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Council Directive
of 3 April 1990
on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms
(90/220/EEC)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular
Article 100a thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
In cooperation with the European Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (3),
Whereas, under the Treaty, action by the Community relating to the environment should be
based on the principle that preventive action should be taken;
Whereas living organisms, whether released into the environment in large or small amounts for
experimental purposes or as commercial products, may reproduce in the environment and cross
national frontiers thereby affecting other Member States; whereas the effects of such releases on
the environment may be irreversible;
Whereas the protection of human health and the environment requires that due attention be given
to controlling risks from the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into
the environment;
Whereas disparity between the rules which are in effect or in preparation in the Member States
concerning the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs may create unequal conditions
of competition or barriers to trade in products containing such organisms, thus affecting the
functioning of the common market; whereas it is therefore necessary to approximate the laws of
the Member States in this respect;
Whereas measures for the approximation of the provisions of the Member States which have as
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market should, inasmuch as they
concern health safety, environmental and consumer protection, be based on a high level of
protection throughout the Community;
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Whereas it is necessary to ensure the safe development of industrial products utilizing GMOs;
Whereas this Directive should not apply to organisms obtained through certain techniques of
genetic modification which have conventionally been used in a number of applications and have
a long safety record;
Whereas it is necessary to establish harmonized procedures and criteria foe the case-by-case
evaluation of the potential risks arising from the deliberate release of GMOs into the
environment;
Whereas a case-by-case environmental risk assessment should always be carried out prior to a
release;
Whereas the deliberate release of GMOs at the research stage is in most cases a necessary step in
the development of new products derived from, or containing, GMOs;
Whereas the introduction of GMOs into the environment should be carried out according to the
'step by step' principle; whereas this means that the containment of GMOs is reduced and the
scale of release increased gradually, step by step, but only if evaluation of the earlier steps in
terms of protection of human health and the environment indicates that the next step can be
taken;
Whereas no product containing, or consisting of, GMOs and intended for deliberate release shall
be considered for placing on the market without it first having been subjected to satisfactory field
testing at the research and development stage in ecosystems which could be affected by its use;
Whereas it is necessary to establish a Community authorization procedure for the placing on the
market of products containing, or consisting of, GMOs where the intended use of the product
involves the deliberate release of the organism(s) into the environment;
Whereas any person, before undertaking a deliberate release into the environment of a GMO, or
the placing on the market of a product containing, or consisting of, GMOs, where the intended
use of that product involves its deliberate release into the environment, shall submit a
notification to the national competent authority;
Whereas that notification should contain a technical dossier of information including a full
environmental risk assessment, appropriate safety and emergency response, and, in the case of
products, precise instructions and conditions for use, and proposed labelling and packaging;
Whereas after notification, no deliberate release of GMOs should be carried our unless the
consent of the competent authority has been obtained; Whereas the competent authority should
give its consent only after it has been satisfied that the release will be safe for human health and
the environment;
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Whereas it may be considered appropriate in certain cases to consult the public on the deliberate
release of GMOs into the environment;
Whereas it is appropriate for the Commission, in consultation with the Member States, to
establish a procedure for the exchange of information on deliberate releases of GMOs notified
under this Directive;
Whereas it is important to follow closely the development and use of GMOs; whereas a list
should be published of all the products authorized under this Directive;
Whereas, when a product containing a GMO or a combination of GMOs is placed on the market,
and where such a product has been properly authorized under this Directive, a Member State
may not on grounds relating to matters covered by this Directive, prohibit, restrict or impede the
deliberate release of the organism in that product on its territory where the conditions set out in
the consent are respected; whereas a safeguard procedure should be provided in case of risk to
human health or the environment;
Whereas the provisions of this Directive relating to placing on the market of products should not
apply to products containing, or consisting of, GMOs covered by other Community legislation
which provides for a specific environmental risk assessment similar to that laid down in this
Directive;
Whereas a Committee should be set up to assist the Commission on matters relating to the
implementation of this Directive and to its adaptation to technical progress,
(1) OJ
OJ
(2) OJ
OJ
(3) OJ

No
No
No
No
No

C
C
C
C
C

198,
246,
158,
96,
23,

28.
27.
26.
17.
30.

7.
9.
6.
4.
1.

1988,
1989,
1989,
1990,
1989,

p. 19 and
p. 5.
p. 225 and
p. 45.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Article 1: Scope and Objectives
1. The objective of this Directive is to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States and to protect human health and the environment:
when carrying out the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms into the
environment,
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when placing on the market products containing, or consisting of, genetically modified
organisms intended for subsequent deliberate release into the environment.
2. This Directive shall not apply to the carriage of genetically modified organisms by rail, road,
inland waterway, sea or air.

Article 2: Legal Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive:
(1) 'organism'is any biological entity capable of replication or of transferring genetic
material;
(2) 'genetically modified organism (GMO)' means an organism in which the genetic
material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural
recombination.
Within the terms of this definition:
(i) genetic modification occurs at least through the use of the techniques listed in Annex I
A Part 1;
(ii) the techniqueslisted in Annex I A Part 2 are not considered to result in genetic
modification;
(3) 'deliberate release' means any intentional introduction into the environment of a GMO
or a combination of GMOs without provisions for containment such as'physical barriers
or a combination of physical barriers together with chemical and/or biological barriers
used to limit their contact with the general population and the environment;
(4) 'product'means a preparation consisting of, or containing, a GMO or a combination of
GMOs, which is paced on the market;
(5) 'placing on the market' means supplying or making available to third parties;
(6) 'notification'means the presentation of documents containing the requisite information
to the competent authority of a Member State. The person making the presentation shall
be referred to as 'the notifier';
(7) 'use'means the deliberate release of a product which has been placed on the market.
The persons carrying our this use will be referred to as 'users';
(8) 'environmental risk assessment'means the evaluation of the risk to human health and
the environment (which includes plants and animals) connected with the release of
GMOs or products containing GMOs.

Article 3: Non Regulated Items
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This Directive shall not apply to organisms obtained through the techniques of genetic
modification listed in Annex I B.

Article 4: Responsiblities of Member States
1. Member States shall ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on
human health and the environment which might arise from the deliberate release or placing on
the market of GMOs.
2. Member States shall designate the competent authority or authorities responsible for carrying
out the requirements of this Directive and its Annexes.
3. Member States shall ensure that the competent authority organizes inspections and other
control measures as appropriate, to ensure compliance with this Directive.

Article 5: Notification Procedures
Member States shall adopt the provisions necessary to ensure that:
(1) any person, before undertaking a deliberate release of a GMO or a combination of
GMOs for the purpose of research and development, or for any other purpose than for
placing on the market, must submit a notification to the competent authority referred to in
Article 4 (2) of the Member State within whose territory the release is to take place;
(2) the notification shall include:
(a) a technical dossier supplying the information specified in Annex II necessary for
evaluating the foreseeable risks, whether immediate or delayed, which the GMO or
combination of GMOs may pose to human health or the environment, together with the
methods used and the bibliographic reference to them and covering, in particular:
(i) general information including information on personnel and training,
(ii) information relating to the GMO(s),
(iii) information relating to the conditions of release and the receiving environment,
(iv) information on the interactions between the GMO(s) and the environment,
(v) information on monitoring, control, waste treatment and emergency response plans;
(b) a statement evaluating the impacts and risks posed by the GMO(s) to human health or
the environment from the uses envisaged;
(3) the competent authority may accept that releases of a combination of GMOs on the
same site or of the same GMO on different sites for the same purpose and within a
limited period may be notified in a single notification;
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(4) the notifier shall include in the notification information on data or results from
releases of the same GMOs or the same combination of GMOs previously or currently
notified and/or carried out by him either inside or outside the Community.
The notifier may also refer to data or results from notifications previously submitted by
other notifiers, provided that the latter have given their agreement in writing;
(5) in the case of a subsequent release of the same GMO or combination of GMOs
previously notifier shall be required to submit a new notification. In this case, the notifier
may refer to data from previous notifications or results from previous releases;
(6) In the event of any modification of the deliberate release of GMOs or a combination
of GMOs which could have consequences with regard to the risks for human health or the
environment or if new information has become available on such risks, either while the
notification is being examined by the competent authority or after that authority has given
its written consent, the notifier shall immediately:
(a) revise the measures specified in the notification,
(b) inform the competent authority in advance of any modification or as soon as the new
information is available,
(c) take the measures necessary to protect human health and the environment.

Article 6: Review Procedures
1. On receipt and after acknowledgment of the notification the competent authority shall:
examine it for compliance with this Directive,
evaluate the risks posed by the release,
record its conclusions in writing, and if necessary,
carry out tests or inspections as may be necessary for control purposes.
2. The competent authority, having considered, where appropriate, any comments by other
Member States made in accordance with Article 9, shall respond in writing to the notifier within
90 days of receipt of the notification by either:
(a) indicating that it is satisfied that the notification is in compliance with this Directive
and that the release may proceed, or
(b) indicating that the release does not fulfil the conditions of this Directive and the
notification is therefore rejected.
3. For the purpose of calculating the 90-day period referred to in paragraph 2, any periods of
time during which the competent authority:
is awaiting further information which it may have requested from the notifier,
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or
is carrying out a public inquiry or consultation in accordance with Article 7 shall not be
taken into account.
4. The notifier may proceed with the release only when he has received the written consent of the
competent authority, and in conformity with any conditions required in this consent.
5. If the competent authority considers that sufficient experience has bee obtained of releases of
certain GMOs, it may submit to the Commission a request for the application of simplified
procedures for releases of such types of GMOs. The Commission shall, in accordance with the
procedures laid down in Article 21, establish appropriate criteria and take a decision accordingly
on each application. The criteria shall be based on safety to human health and the environment
and on the evidence available on such safety.
6. If information becomes available subsequently to the competent authority which could have
significant consequences for the risks posed by the release, the competent authority may require
the notifier to modify the conditions of, suspend or terminate the deliberate release.

Article 7: Public Awareness
Where a Member State considers it appropriate, it may provide that groups or the public shall be
consulted on any aspect of the proposed deliberate release.

Article 8: Termination Reporting Procedures
After completion of a release, the notifier shall send to the competent authority the result of the
release in respect of any risk to human health or the environment, with particular reference to
any kind of product that the notifier intends to notify at later stage.

Article 10: Compliance Requirements
1. Consent may only be given for the placing on the market of products containing, or consisting
of, GMOs, provided that:
written consent has been given to a notification under Part B or if a risk analysis has been
carried out based on the elements outlined in that Part;
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the products comply with the relevant Community product legislation;
the products comply with the requirements of this Part of this Directive, concerning the
environmental risk assessment.
2. Articles 11 to 18 shall not apply to any products covered by Community legislation which
provides for a specific environmental risk assessment similar to that laid down in this Directive.
3. Not later than 12 months after notification of this Directive, the Commission, in accordance
with the procedure laid down in Article 21, shall establish a list of Community legislation
covering the products referred to in paragraph 2. This list will be re-examined periodically and,
as necessary, revised in accordance with the said procedure.

Article 11: Notification Procedures
1. Before a GMO or a combination of GMOs are placed on the market as or in a product, the
manufacturer or the importer to the Community shall submit a notification to the competent
authority of the Member State where such a product is to be placed on the market for the first
time. This notification shall contain:
the information required in Annex II, extended as necessary to take into account the
diversity of sites of use of the product, including information on data and results obtained
from research and developmental releases concerning the ecosystems which could be
affected by the use of the product and an assessment of any risks for human health and
the environment related to the GMOs or a combination of GMOs contained in the
product, including information obtained from the research and development stage on the
impact of the release on human health and the environment;
the conditions for the placing on the market of the product, including specific conditions
of use and handling and a proposal for labelling and packaging which should comprise at
least the requirements laid down in Annex III.
If on the basis of the results of any release notified under Part B of this Directive, or on
substantive, reasoned scientific grounds, a notifier considers that the placing on the market and
use of a product do not pose a risk to human health and the environment, he may propose not to
comply with one or more of the requirements of Annex III B.
2. The notifier shall include in this notification information on data or results from releases of the
same GMOs or the same combination of GMOs previously or currently notified and /or carried
out by the notifier either inside or outside the Community.
3. The notifier may also refer to data or results from notifications previously submitted by other
notifiers, provided that the latter have given their agreement in writing.
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4. Each new product which, containing or consisting of the same GMO or combination of
GMOs, is intended for a different use, shall be notified separately.
5. The notifier may proceed with the release only when he has received the written consent of the
competent authority in accordance with Article 13, and in conformity with any conditions,
including reference to particular ecosystems/environments, required in that consent. 6. If new
information has become available with regard to the risks of the product to human health or the
environment, either before or after the written consent, the notifier shall immediately:
revise the information and conditions specified in paragraph 1,
inform the competent authority, and
take the measures necessary to protect human health and the environment.

Article 12: Review Procedures by Competent National Authorities
1. On receipt and after acknowledgement of the notification referred to in Article 11, the
competent authority shall examine it for compliance with this Directive, giving particular
attention to the environmental risk assessment and the recommended precautions related to the
safe use of the product.
2. At the latest 90 days after receipt of the notification, the competent authority shall either:
(a) forward the dossier to the Commission with a favourable opinion, or
(b) inform the notifier that the proposed release does not fulfil the conditions of this
Directive and that it is therefore rejected.
3. In the case referred to in paragraph 2 (a), the dossier forwarded to the Commission shall
include a summary of the notification together with a statement of the conditions under which
the competent authority proposes to consent to the placing on the market of the product.
The format of this summary shall be established by the Commission in accordance with the
procedure laid down in Article 21.
In particular where the competent authority has acceded to the request of the notifier, under the
terms of the last subparagraph of Article 11 (1), not to comply with some of the requirements of
Annex III B, it shall at the same time inform the Commission thereof.
4. If the competent authority receives additional information pursuant to Article 11 (6), it shall
immediately inform the Commission and the other Member States.
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5. For the purpose of calculating the 90-day period referred to in paragraph 2, any periods of
time during which the competent authority is awaiting further information which it may have
requested from the notifier shall not be taken into account.

Article 13: Review Procedures at Community Level
1. On receipt of the dossier referred to in Article 12 (3), the Commission shall immediately
forward it to the competent authorities all Member States together with any other information it
has collected pursuant to this Directive and advise the competent authority responsible for
forwarding the document of the distribution date.
2. The competent authority, in the absence of any indication to the contrary from another
Member State within 60 days following the distribution date referred to in paragraph 1, shall give
its consent in writing to the notification so that the product can be placed on the market and shall
inform the other Member States and the Commission thereof.
3. In cases where the competent authority of another Member State raises an objection - for
which the reasons must be stated - and should it not be possible for the competent authorities
concerned to reach an agreement within the period specified in paragraph 2, the Commission
shall take a decision in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21.
4. Where the Commission has taken a favourable decision, the competent authority that received
the original notification shall give consent in writing to the notification so that the product may
be placed on the market and shall inform the other Member States and the Commission thereof.
5. Once a product has received a written consent, it may be used without further notification
throughout the Community in so far as the specific conditions of use and the environments
and/or geographical areas stipulated in these conditions are strictly adhered to.
6. Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that users comply with the
conditions of use specified in the written consent.

Article 14: Labeling and Packaging
Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that product containing, or consisting
of, GMOs will be placed on the market only if their labelling and packaging is that specified in
the written consent referred to in Articles 12 and 13.
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Article 15: Free Movement of Goods
Member States may not, on grounds relating to the notification and written consent of a
deliberate release under this Directive, prohibit, restrict or impede the placing in the market of
products containing, or consisting of, GMOs which comply with the requirements of this
Directive.

Article 16: Revocation of Free Movement of Goods
1. Where a Member State has justifiable reasons to consider that a product which has been
properly notified and has received written consent under this Directive constitutes a risk to
human health or the environment, it may provisionally restrict or prohibit these and/or sale of
that product on its territory. It shall immediately inform the Commission and the other Member
States of such action and give reasons for its decision.
2. A decision shall be taken on the matter within three montsin accordance with the procedure
laid down in article 21.

Article 17: Public Awareness
The Commission shall publish in the Official Journal of the European Communities a list of all
the products receiving final written consent under this Directive. For each product, the GMO or
GMOs contained therein and the use or uses shall be clearly specified.

Article 18: Reporting Procedures at Community Level
1. Member States shall send to the Commission, at the end of each year, a brief factual report on
the control of the use of all products placed on the market under this Directive.
2. The Commission shall send to the European Parliament and the Council, every three years, a
report on the control by the Member States of the products placed on the market under this
Directive.
3. When submitting this report for the first time, the Commission shall at the same time submit a
specific report on the operation of this Part of this Directive including an assessment of all its
implications.
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Article 19: Confidentiality & Intellectual Property Rights
1. The Commission and the competent authorities shall not divulge to third parties any
confidential information notified or exchanged under this Directive and shall protect intellectual
property rights relating to the data received.
2. The notifier may indicate the information in the notification submitted under this Directive,
the disclosure of which might harm his competitive position, that should therefore be treated as
confidential. Verifiable justification must be given in such cases.
3. The competent authority shall decide, after consultation with the notifier, which information
will be kept confidential and shall inform the notifier of its decisions. 4. In no case may the
following information when submitted according to Articles 5 or 11 be kept confidential:
description of the GMO or GMOs, name and address of the notifier, purpose of the
release and location of release;
methods and plans for monitoring of the GMO or GMOs and for emergency response;
the evaluation of foreseeable effects, in particular any pathogenic and/or ecologically
disruptive effects.
5. If, for whatever reasons, the notifier withdraws the notification, the competent authorities and
the Commission must respect the confidentiality of the information supplied.

Article 20: Amending Review and Notification Procedures
According to the procedure laid down in Article 21, the Commission shall adapt Annexes II and
III to technical progress in particular by amending the notification requirements to take into
account the potential hazard of the GMOs.

Article 21: Member State Representation
The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of the representatives of the
Member States and chaired by the representative of the Commission.
The representative of the Commission shall submit to the committee a draft of the measures to be
taken. The committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft within a time limit which the
chairman may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. The opinion shall be delivered
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by the majority laid down in Article 148 (2) of the Treaty in the case of decisions which the
Council is required to adopt on a proposal from the Commission. The votes of the representatives
of the Member States within tho committee shall be weighted in the manner set out in that
Article. The chairman shall not vote.
The Commission shall adopt the measures envisaged if they are in accordance with the opinion
of the committee.
If the measures envisaged are not in accordance with the opinion of the committee, or if no
opinion is delivered, the Commission shall, without delay, submit to the Council a proposal
relating to the measures to be taken. The Council shall act by a qualified majority.
If, on the expiry of a period of three months from the date of referral to the Council, the Council
has not acted, the proposed measures shall be adopted by the Commission.

Article 22: Information Exchange
1. Member States and the Commission shall meet regularly and exchange information on the
experience acquired with regard to the prevention of risks related to the release of GMOs into the
environment.
2. Every three years, Member States shall send the Commission a report on the measures taken to
implement the provisions of this Directive, the first time being on 1 September 1992.
3. Every three years, the Commission shall publish a summary based on the reports referred to in
paragraph 2, the first time being in 1993.

Article 23: Member State Obligations
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
necessary to comply with this Directive before 23 October 1991.
2. Member States shall immediately inform the Commission of all laws, regulations and
administrative provisions adopted in implementation of this Directive.

Article 24: Publication Date
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This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Luxemburg, 23 April 1990.
For the Council
The Present
A.REYNOLDS
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